FUXA CVE-2026-43945
HIGHSeverity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable substring bypass needs no auth or interaction (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N); Node-RED code exec gives full C:H/I:H/A:H within the container, no cross-authority scope change so S:U.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
Pre-auth RCE in FUXA via Logic Bypass
Summary
A Critical vulnerability chain exists in FUXA (v.1.3.0-2706) that allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to achieve Full Remote Code Execution (RCE) as root. The exploit succeeds even when the platform is configured in its most secure state (Secure Mode Enabled and Node-RED Secure Auth Enabled).
Details The vulnerability is a Path Confusion flaw in the authentication middleware. The server uses a substring match on the full URL (including query parameters) to exclude certain paths from authentication.
Involved Logic:
JavaScript:
const url = req.originalUrl || req.url || req.path;
if (url.includes('/socket.io')) return next();
By appending ?x=/socket.io to any administrative request, the middleware is "tricked" into treating the request as a public WebSocket handshake, bypassing the secureEnabled and nodeRedAuthMode checks entirely.Proof of Concept
A specially crafted request containing manipulated query parameters could bypass authentication checks on protected /nodered/* endpoints.
In configurations where Node-RED exposed privileged or command-execution capable nodes, this could lead to remote code execution within the container context.
Impact Access Level: Unauthenticated / Remote.
Privilege Level: Access to Node-RED administrative endpoints. Remote code execution may be possible depending on the Node-RED configuration and installed nodes.
CVSS 3.1 Score: High severity.
Description: An attacker can gain total control over the SCADA server, allowing them to intercept industrial data (MQTT/OPC-UA), manipulate PLC tags, or pivot into the internal OT network.
Root Cause & Remediation The root cause is the reliance on req.originalUrl for security-critical routing decisions.
The Fix: The developer must use req.path (which Express pre-parses to remove query strings) or a formal URL parser to ensure that the security check is performed only against the pathname.
JavaScript
// Secure approach
const pathname = req.path;
if (pathname.startsWith('/socket.io/')) return next();This issue affects only setups where Node-RED is enabled.
AnalysisAI
Pre-authentication remote code execution in FUXA (open-source web SCADA/HMI) versions >= 1.2.11 and < 1.3.1 lets an unauthenticated remote attacker reach protected Node-RED administrative endpoints by abusing a path-confusion flaw in the authentication middleware. Because the middleware does a substring match against the full request URL including the query string, appending '?x=/socket.io' to any admin request is treated as a public WebSocket handshake, bypassing secure mode and Node-RED auth; where Node-RED exposes command-capable nodes this yields code execution in the container. Publicly available exploit code exists (CVSS 4.0 E:P) and the vendor rates it critical, though EPSS is only 0.73% and it is not in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
FUXA is a Node.js/Express-based SCADA and HMI platform that embeds Node-RED as a flow/automation engine. The vulnerability (CWE-94, Improper Control of Generation of Code, chained from a path-confusion authorization flaw) lives in the Express authentication middleware, which builds its allow-list decision from 'const url = req.originalUrl || req.url || req.path' and calls url.includes('/socket.io') to skip auth for WebSocket traffic. Because req.originalUrl retains the raw query string, a substring match rather than a pathname comparison lets attacker-controlled query parameters satisfy the exclusion. The correct primitive is req.path (Express-parsed, query stripped) with a startsWith('/socket.io/') check. The affected package is npm @frangoteam/fuxa (pkg:npm/@frangoteam_fuxa). Once past auth, the attacker interacts with /nodered/* admin endpoints; Node-RED's exec/function nodes provide the code-execution sink.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to FUXA 1.3.1 or later, which the release notes describe as fixing 'authentication bypass in request routing logic' (#2260) by comparing against the parsed pathname (req.path.startsWith('/socket.io/')) instead of a substring match on the full URL; see the advisory at https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-p69w-mmfv-xrfj and release https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.1. If immediate patching is not possible, disable the Node-RED integration entirely, which removes the RCE sink at the cost of losing Node-RED-based automation flows; where Node-RED must stay enabled, remove or restrict command/exec-capable nodes to eliminate the code-execution path. As a network compensating control, place FUXA behind a reverse proxy or WAF that strips or rejects requests whose query string contains '/socket.io' on /nodered/* and other admin paths, and restrict access to the management interface to trusted management networks rather than exposing it to the internet or the broader OT network - accepting that proxy rules are a fragile stopgap against query-parameter smuggling and can break legitimate WebSocket handshakes if written too broadly.
Same weakness CWE-94 – Code Injection
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-p69w-mmfv-xrfj