CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
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2DescriptionNVD
Improper Following of a Certificate's Chain of Trust vulnerability in Erlang OTP public_key (pubkey_cert module) allows a non-CA certificate to be accepted as an intermediate issuer, enabling certificate chain forgery.
In lib/public_key/src/pubkey_cert.erl, pubkey_cert:validate_extensions/7 contains two flaws that together allow a certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension to be used as an intermediate issuer in a chain passed to public_key:pkix_path_validation/3: the cA:false clause recurses into the remaining extensions without rejecting the certificate when it is in issuer position, and the keyUsage check only fires when the extension is present, so a certificate lacking keyUsage entirely bypasses the keyCertSign enforcement.
Any party holding an end-entity certificate with basicConstraints cA:false and no keyUsage extension, issued by any CA in the victim's trust store, can use that certificate's private key to sign forged leaf certificates for arbitrary identities. public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 accepts the resulting chain, and by extension every TLS or mTLS endpoint built on the OTP ssl application that relies on the default verifier is affected, including server identity verification on the client side and client certificate verification on mTLS servers.
This issue affects OTP from OTP 17.0 before OTP 26.2.5.21, 27.3.4.12, 28.5.0.1, and 29.0.1 corresponding to public_key from 0.22 before 1.15.1.7, 1.17.1.3, 1.20.3.1, and 1.21.1.
AnalysisAI
Certificate chain forgery in Erlang/OTP's public_key application (pubkey_cert module) lets a non-CA end-entity certificate act as an intermediate issuer, allowing an attacker holding such a certificate's private key to sign forged leaf certificates for arbitrary identities that public_key:pkix_path_validation/3 will accept. This breaks server identity verification for TLS clients and client-certificate verification for mTLS servers across any application using the OTP ssl stack with the default verifier. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all Erlang/OTP deployments using the public_key and ssl modules; document versions and deployment scope. Within 7 days: Implement certificate pinning or custom validation layers for critical TLS connections; restrict certificate issuance authority and monitor certificate creation events; evaluate whether vendor fix commits (available in Erlang/OTP source repositories) can be applied to custom builds. …
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EUVD-2026-32272