Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-33431?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-33431. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Roxy Wi CVE-2026-33431

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-33431?

CVE-2026-33431 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.7 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

EUVD-2026-23966 MEDIUM

Path Traversal: '../filedir' (CWE-24)

2026-04-20 GitHub_M

Apache Path Traversal Nginx Roxy Wi

5.7

CVSS 4.0 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

5.7 MEDIUM

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch released

Apr 24, 2026 - 19:19 nvd

Patch available

Apr 20, 2026 - 22:31 EUVD

Analysis Generated

Apr 20, 2026 - 21:44 vuln.today

CVSS changed

Apr 20, 2026 - 21:22 NVD

5.7 (MEDIUM)

EUVD ID Assigned

Apr 20, 2026 - 21:15 euvd

EUVD-2026-23966

Analysis Generated

Apr 20, 2026 - 21:15 vuln.today

CVE Published

Apr 20, 2026 - 20:24 nvd

MEDIUM 5.7

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. Prior to version 8.2.6.4, the POST /config/<service>/show API endpoint accepts a configver parameter that is directly appended to a base directory path to construct a local file path, which is subsequently opened and its contents returned to the caller. The existing path traversal guard only inspects the base directory variable (which is never user-controlled) and entirely ignores the user-supplied configver value. An authenticated attacker can supply a configver value containing ../ sequences to escape the intended directory and read arbitrary files accessible to the web application process. Version 8.2.6.4 contains a patch for the issue.

AnalysisAI

Roxy-WI versions prior to 8.2.6.4 allow authenticated attackers to read arbitrary files via path traversal in the POST /config/<service>/show API endpoint. The configver parameter is directly concatenated into a file path without proper validation, permitting directory escape sequences (../) to bypass the existing path guard. An authenticated user can exploit this to access sensitive configuration files and other data readable by the web application process.

Technical ContextAI

Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing multiple load-balancing and service platforms (HAProxy, Nginx, Apache, Keepalived). The vulnerable endpoint constructs a local file path by appending user-supplied input (configver) to a base directory path and then opens and returns the file contents. The root cause (CWE-24: Path Traversal) stems from incomplete input validation-the application checks the base directory variable for traversal sequences but fails to sanitize the user-controlled configver parameter before path construction. This is a classic concatenation-then-validate logic flaw where the attacker can inject ../ sequences into configver to escape the intended directory scope.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade Roxy-WI to version 8.2.6.4 or later. The fix is confirmed in the upstream repository commit d4d100067dd0ee04317f05d3b51be8fcfdc3f802 (https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/commit/d4d100067dd0ee04317f05d3b51be8fcfdc3f802), which implements proper input validation on the configver parameter to reject or neutralize path traversal sequences. If immediate patching is not feasible, implement a network-level compensating control: restrict POST requests to /config/*/show to a whitelist of trusted internal IP addresses or require an additional authentication layer (e.g., IP-based ACL via reverse proxy). This mitigates the risk by limiting exposure to authenticated users within a controlled network perimeter. Note that this workaround does not eliminate the vulnerability for legitimate internal users and should be treated as temporary.