Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Primary rating from Vendor (dahua) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: dahua
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
A vulnerability has been found in some Dahua products. An attacker may obtain the device’s CA root certificate. If that CA is installed and trusted on client systems, the attacker could issue fraudulent certificates trusted by those clients and undermine the certificate trust chain.
AnalysisAI
CA root certificate exposure in Dahua IPC devices allows unauthenticated network-based attackers, under specific prerequisite conditions, to retrieve the device's internal CA root certificate. If the obtained certificate is installed and trusted on client systems, the attacker could leverage it to issue fraudulent certificates recognized as valid by those clients, collapsing the integrity of affected certificate trust chains. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not in CISA KEV), no public exploit code has been identified, and the CVSS 4.0 score of 2.3 reflects the multi-step, user-dependent nature of the full attack chain.
Technical ContextAI
CWE-538 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Externally-Accessible File or Directory) identifies the root cause: sensitive PKI material - specifically the CA root certificate, and potentially associated private key material - is stored or served via an endpoint reachable over the network. The affected product class is Dahua IPC (IP Camera) devices, identified by CPE cpe:2.3:a:dahua:ipc:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*. Dahua IPC devices operate internal PKIs to sign device communications, and the flaw allows external parties to retrieve this trust anchor. The downstream risk stems from the way operating systems and browsers extend implicit trust to installed CA certificates: once a CA is trusted, all certificates it signs are accepted without further validation, enabling man-in-the-middle scenarios or service impersonation against affected clients.
RemediationAI
Update affected Dahua IPC devices to firmware with a build date of April 15, 2026 or later, per vendor advisory DHCC-SA-202606-001 (https://www.dahuasecurity.com/about-dahua/trust-center/dahua-psirt/dhcc-sa-202606-001). An exact patched firmware version string was not independently confirmed in available data; contact Dahua support to identify the specific update package for each device model. As compensating controls where patching is not immediately feasible: restrict network access to Dahua IPC management interfaces using firewall rules or VLAN segmentation to prevent unauthorized certificate retrieval; audit client systems in the environment for any previously installed Dahua-issued CA certificates and revoke trust if the installation was not explicitly authorized; and enforce certificate pinning on applications communicating with Dahua devices where technically feasible. Note that VLAN segmentation limits device management reach but does not remediate the underlying vulnerability and should be treated as a temporary measure only.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-35984
GHSA-9359-w3rx-353r