EUVD-2026-18229CVSS Vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3Description
SzafirHost downloads necessary files in the context of the initiating web page. When called, SzafirHost updates its dynamic library. JAR files are correctly verified based on a list of trusted file hashes, and if a file was not on that list, it was checked to see if it had been digitally signed by the vendor. The application doesn't verify hash or vendor's digital signature of uploaded DLL, SO, JNILIB or DYLIB file. The attacker can provide malicious file which will be saved in users /temp folder and executed by the application. This issue was fixed in version 1.1.0.
Analysis
Cryptographic verification bypass in SzafirHost (e-signature client software) allows remote attackers to deliver and execute malicious native libraries (DLL/SO/JNILIB/DYLIB) without authentication. While JAR files are hash- and signature-verified during auto-update, native libraries downloaded into the user's /temp folder skip all integrity checks, enabling code execution in the context of the web page initiating the download. …
Sign in for full analysis, threat intelligence, and remediation guidance.
Remediation
Within 24 hours: Identify all endpoints running SzafirHost versions below 1.1.0 using inventory/asset management tools and notify affected teams. Within 7 days: Upgrade all SzafirHost installations to version 1.1.0 or later; coordinate with business units to schedule updates during low-risk windows. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps.
Priority Score
Share
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today