EUVD-2026-18229Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
7DescriptionCVE.org
SzafirHost downloads necessary files in the context of the initiating web page. When called, SzafirHost updates its dynamic library. JAR files are correctly verified based on a list of trusted file hashes, and if a file was not on that list, it was checked to see if it had been digitally signed by the vendor. The application doesn't verify hash or vendor's digital signature of uploaded DLL, SO, JNILIB or DYLIB file. The attacker can provide malicious file which will be saved in users /temp folder and executed by the application.
This issue was fixed in version 1.1.0.
AnalysisAI
Cryptographic verification bypass in SzafirHost (e-signature client software) allows remote attackers to deliver and execute malicious native libraries (DLL/SO/JNILIB/DYLIB) without authentication. While JAR files are hash- and signature-verified during auto-update, native libraries downloaded into the user's /temp folder skip all integrity checks, enabling code execution in the context of the web page initiating the download. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Remote unauthenticated attacker can exploit SzafirHost versions before 1.1.0 by providing malicious DLL, SO, JNILIB, or DYLIB files during application update. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Real-world risk is moderate-to-high for targeted attacks against Polish digital signature users but low for broad exploitation. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker hosts a malicious website or compromises a legitimate site frequented by Polish e-signature users. When a victim with SzafirHost installed visits the page, embedded JavaScript triggers the SzafirHost auto-update mechanism, requesting a native library file. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade SzafirHost to version 1.1.0 or later, which implements cryptographic hash validation and digital signature verification for native library files matching the existing JAR file controls. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all systems running SzafirHost and document current versions via inventory or EDR telemetry. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
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