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NSD CVE-2026-12244

| EUVDEUVD-2026-39182 HIGH
Integer Overflow or Wraparound (CWE-190)
2026-06-25 NLnet Labs GHSA-p22w-wq6p-g85g
8.7
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: NLnet Labs
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Severity by source

Vendor (NLnet Labs) PRIMARY
8.7 HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
8.8 HIGH

Network-delivered via AXFR (AV:N), low complexity (AC:L), but requires the trusted primary role so PR:L; controlled heap write yields high C/I/A with no scope change.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
HIGH
qualitative
Red Hat
8.0 HIGH
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (NLnet Labs).

CVSS VectorVendor: NLnet Labs

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Patch available
Jun 25, 2026 - 08:01 EUVD
Analysis Generated
Jun 25, 2026 - 07:00 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

If NSD is configured as secondary for a zone, the primary of that zone can crash NSD with an AXFR containing a DNS message with a special crafted SVCB RR with an rdata size of 65512, that let's an (uint16_t) variable that is used to allocate space needed for the RR wrap (because total size > 65535), causing a heap overflow. The attacker can perform a controlled (RCE class) head write of up to 65509 bytes

AnalysisAI

Heap overflow in NLnet Labs NSD allows a malicious or compromised zone primary to corrupt memory on a secondary (slave) NSD instance by sending an AXFR transfer containing a crafted SVCB resource record. An rdata size of 65512 causes a uint16_t length variable used for RR allocation to wrap (total size exceeds 65535), producing an undersized buffer and a controlled out-of-bounds write of up to 65509 bytes - an RCE-class primitive (CWE-190 integer overflow leading to heap overflow). No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the controlled write and remote network vector (CVSS 4.0 base 8.7) make this a high-priority patch for any operator running NSD as a secondary.

Technical ContextAI

NSD (Name Server Daemon) is an authoritative-only DNS nameserver from NLnet Labs, commonly deployed as a secondary that pulls zones from a primary via AXFR/IXFR zone transfers. The flaw is in NSD's parsing/allocation of a received SVCB resource record (RFC 9460, used for HTTPS/service binding records) during AXFR processing. Per CWE-190, the code computes the buffer size for the incoming RR using a 16-bit (uint16_t) variable; an rdata length of 65512 pushes the computed total (rdata plus RR overhead) past 65535, wrapping the 16-bit value to a small number. The subsequent allocation is therefore far smaller than the data copied into it, yielding a heap buffer overflow whose contents and length (up to 65509 bytes) are attacker-controlled, placing this in the remote-code-execution risk class rather than mere denial of service. The CPE cpe:2.3:a:nlnet_labs:nsd:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* indicates all NSD versions prior to the fix should be treated as potentially affected pending exact version confirmation.

RemediationAI

Upgrade NSD to the fixed release identified in the NLnet Labs advisory at https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/downloads/nsd/CVE-2026-12244.txt; the exact patched version number is not included in the provided data and must be taken from that advisory - patch available per vendor advisory, version to be confirmed from the source. As compensating controls until patched: enforce TSIG authentication on all zone transfers so that only the legitimate, key-holding primary can send AXFR data (this blocks spoofed/on-path primaries but does not protect against a genuinely compromised primary); strictly limit the allow-notify/request-xfr and provide-xfr ACLs to known primary IP addresses and bind transfer endpoints to trusted management networks (trade-off: must be kept in sync as topology changes); and where feasible, place secondaries behind network controls that restrict inbound TCP/53 to the known primary only. None of these controls neutralize a malicious or fully compromised primary, so patching is the only complete fix.

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important

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CVE-2026-12244 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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