Pi-hole CVE-2026-119334

Exploitation requires an authenticated Pi-hole administrator who can add adlists AND can write to the host filesystem to pre-position both a symlink and a pihole-readable decoy file. The flaw is triggered specifically through file:// scheme adlists whose path contains dot segments (e.g. '/l/../../etc/shadow') or /proc/self components, exploiting that 'sudo -u pihole test -r' resolves symlinks-then-.. through the kernel while curl strips dot segments from the URL text before opening - so the two resolve to different files. The root-only read only occurs when gravity runs as root (via 'pihole -g' or cron). Limiting factors: admin privilege plus local filesystem placement are both mandatory (hence not remotely exploitable against a default install), and the companion FTL fix removes reflected sample lines, so only domain-shaped lines from the target leak. Versions <= 6.4.3 are affected; 6.5 is fixed.

All signals point to a genuinely low-priority issue rather than a high-CVSS-but-overstated one. The CVSS 3.1 base score is 2.2 with vector AV:N/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N, meaning high attack complexity and high privileges required, and only low confidentiality impact (C:L, I:N, A:N). This aligns with the vuln.today decision label of 'monitor' and the GHSA description, which stresses that exploitation needs an administrator who can add adlists AND the ability to place a symlink plus a decoy file on the host filesystem - a combination that already implies substantial access. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or standalone exploit reference is present in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis; note, however, that the fix commit itself ships a bats test demonstrating the file-confusion technique (reading /etc/shadow via a crafted file:// adlist), which documents the mechanism publicly even though it is not packaged as a weaponized exploit. One tension worth flagging: the provided CVSS vector uses AV:N, yet the described exploitation is fundamentally local/config-dependent (the attacker must already place filesystem artifacts and hold admin), so the network vector likely overstates remote reachability - verify against deployment reality. The practical confidentiality leak is further constrained by the companion FTL fix (GHSA-667h-gpmh-7gxc), which stops sample lines being reflected, so only domain-shaped lines from a root-only target can leak.

A Pi-hole administrator (or an attacker who has already compromised an admin account) places a pihole-readable decoy file and a symlink on the host, then adds a file:// adlist whose path contains dot segments or /proc/self components. The 'sudo -u pihole test -r' readability check resolves to the harmless decoy and passes, but curl - running as root during 'pihole -g' or cron - normalizes the URL differently and opens a root-only target such as /etc/shadow, leaking domain-shaped lines from it into gravity. No standalone public exploit is identified, though the fix commit includes a bats test that demonstrates the exact technique.