n8n CVE-2026-118644

Exploitation requires: (1) the attacker to hold a project-editor role in a shared n8n team project (PR:L - authenticated insider); (2) the ability to edit a colleague's workflow settings.errorWorkflow value; (3) the n8n dynamic credentials feature to be in use so that per-user secrets exist to resolve; and (4) the targeted colleague's workflow to actually fail (AT:P) so the error workflow is invoked with the inherited execution context (UI:P - the victim runs/triggers the workflow). Limiting factors: this is not remotely exploitable by unauthenticated users - it is an abuse of an already-granted editor privilege within a multi-tenant project, depends on the victim's workflow failing, and is irrelevant on single-user instances or where dynamic credentials are not used. Affected versions are n8n before 2.41.5 and 2.42.x before 2.42.2.

This is a genuine but moderate-priority issue, consistent with its Medium severity (CVSS 4.0 base 5.1) and the vuln.today 'this_month' decision label - real enough to remediate on a normal patch cadence, not an emergency. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P) makes the practical constraints explicit: the attacker must already hold a project-editor role (PR:L, so this is an insider/authenticated abuse of privilege per CWE-266, not an anonymous internet attack), a specific attack requirement must hold (AT:P - the targeted colleague's workflow must actually fail), and passive user interaction is needed (UI:P - the victim must run or trigger the affected workflow). Impact is split: direct vulnerable-system impact is low (VC:L/VI:L) but the subsequent-system impact is high (SC:H/SI:H) because the attacker resolves another user's per-user dynamic credential secrets and inherits their identity. No CISA KEV listing is present and no EPSS score was supplied, so widespread automated exploitation is not indicated; the preconditions (privileged multi-tenant project, dynamic credentials enabled, a failing victim workflow) point to targeted insider abuse rather than mass exploitation. There are no conflicting signals in the data - the network vector, authenticated privilege requirement, and credential-theft impact all line up with the description. The main missing signals are EPSS and any independent exploitation telemetry.

A project editor in a shared n8n team project changes a colleague's workflow so its settings.errorWorkflow points to an error workflow the attacker owns. When the colleague's workflow fails, n8n passes the failed run's full execution context - including the carrier binding the run to the colleague's identity - into the attacker's error workflow, letting the attacker resolve the colleague's per-user dynamic credential secrets. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; only vendor/VulnCheck advisories exist.