Jenkins CVE-2026-117616

Requires an authenticated account (not anonymous) holding Overall/Read permission - the advisory names this exact permission as the prerequisite. The attacker reaches an HTTP endpoint that loads agents by name without validating the name, allowing any existing config.xml on the controller filesystem to be loaded as an agent configuration and to replace an existing agent or define a new one. Code execution is not immediate: the declared name controls where the agent configuration is written, and only when the agent is saved does Jenkins overwrite the config.xml at that location, which the vendor states can lead to arbitrary code execution. Limiting factors: authenticated Overall/Read access is mandatory; exploitation depends on the save/overwrite step and the presence/placement of a usable config.xml on the controller; affects Jenkins 2.587 and earlier and LTS 2.580.1 and earlier only. The only complete fix stated is updating to Jenkins 2.588 or LTS 2.580.2.

No CVSS vector is present in the supplied feed - the Jenkins advisory labels the core issues 'High' but provides no machine-readable vector (NVD shows CVSS N/A), so severity signals must be reconstructed from the description. By mechanism this is serious: an HTTP endpoint loads agents by name without validation, letting a user with only Overall/Read permission load any config.xml on the controller as an agent and, on save, overwrite a controller-side config.xml at an attacker-influenced path, which the advisory states can lead to arbitrary code execution in the controller context. My independent assessment is CVSS:3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H (~8.8). Counterbalancing signals: there is no EPSS score in the input, the CVE is not in CISA KEV, no PoC or exploit reference is provided, and the vuln.today Decision label is 'awaiting_data' - so there is no evidence of active exploitation, only a low-privilege authenticated path to controller RCE. The one hard prerequisite - an authenticated account holding Overall/Read - materially narrows the attacker population versus an unauthenticated flaw, but Overall/Read is a very common low grant, so for internet-exposed or multi-tenant Jenkins this is a real patch priority rather than a high-score-but-low-risk item; absent exploitation telemetry, treat the 'awaiting_data' decision as not-yet-prioritized rather than low risk.

An authenticated low-privilege user holding Overall/Read invokes the unvalidated agent-loading HTTP endpoint, naming an arbitrary config.xml already on the controller filesystem so Jenkins loads it as an agent configuration; because the declared name also dictates where the agent config is written, saving the agent overwrites a controller-side config.xml at that location, which the vendor states can result in arbitrary code execution on the controller. No public exploit is identified at the time of analysis, and the precise write-to-RCE chain is not detailed in the available sources.