Lagoon Core CVE-2026-113788

Exploitation requires an authenticated Lagoon user account (PR:L) and network access to the ssh service of Lagoon core specifically - the separate ssh-portal service and its components are NOT affected. The flaw is reachable by sending a crafted ssh username/argument that fails to map cleanly to a namespace (the condition addressed by PR #4153). Limiting factors: the attacker must already be a provisioned Lagoon user (not anonymous), only the ssh service in Lagoon core is vulnerable, and only versions prior to 2.33.1 are exposed (fixed in v2.33.2 / helm chart v1.62.2). Operators who have disabled the Lagoon core ssh service, or who rely solely on ssh-portal, are not exploitable. Detection is possible by monitoring the ssh service container logs for the string 'too many arguments'.

This is a genuine high-priority issue for organizations actually running Lagoon core, though its real-world blast radius is constrained by prerequisites and product footprint. The vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) with full high impact to both vulnerable and subsequent systems (VC/VI/VA:H, SC/SI/SA:H) scores 9.4, reflecting OS command injection (CWE-78) in the ssh service that yields arbitrary code execution and potential escalation to administrative permissions - consistent with the description. The critical limiter, explicitly stated by the vendor, is PR:L: an attacker MUST already possess a valid Lagoon user account, so this is authenticated abuse by an existing (possibly low-privileged) tenant rather than fully anonymous internet exploitation. No EPSS score, CISA KEV listing, or public POC was provided in the input, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation - this is a patch-promptly priority for Lagoon operators, not a mass-exploitation emergency. The CWE-78 command-injection nature plus a documented detection signature ('too many arguments' in ssh container logs) indicates the fix (PR #4153: reject ssh usernames that can't map to a namespace) addresses a concrete, triggerable flaw rather than a theoretical one.

An attacker who holds a legitimate (even low-privilege) Lagoon user account connects to the Lagoon core ssh service and supplies a crafted ssh username/argument that is not properly validated, injecting OS commands that execute in the ssh service context. By escaping normal command handling the attacker runs arbitrary code and can escalate toward administrative permissions across the platform. No public exploit code was identified in the provided data, but the vendor documents a log signature ('too many arguments') indicating the flaw is reliably triggerable.