Privasys ra-tls-clients CVE-2026-108361

Exploitation requires the attacker to already hold local, low-privilege access on the host serving as the Attester (the TLS endpoint being attested), AND an attested connection (deterministic or challenge mode) that has already been successfully appraised and established. The attacker must then modify the workload's code, data, or configuration during the live window between connection establishment and termination - this timing constraint is exactly what the CVSS AT:P (Attack Requirements: Present) flag encodes. Limiting factors that reduce real-world risk: no network-remote path (AV:L - the attacker needs local presence on the Attester), low-but-nonzero privilege is still needed (PR:L), the attack only succeeds against an active connection and ends when it terminates, and only versions before 0.9.1 are affected. 'none' (unattested) connections are not in scope for this attested-state trust break.

This is CWE-367 (TOCTOU) in a remote-attestation TLS library: attestation is performed once at connection establishment, and the verifying peer keeps trusting that initial state for the connection's lifetime, so a locally-positioned attacker can mutate the Attester's workload after appraisal. The provided CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N, VC:H/VI:H/VA:N, score 7.2 / HIGH) is internally consistent with the description: exploitation is LOCAL (AV:L) on the Attester endpoint, requires low privileges (PR:L), and depends on a timing window captured by AT:P (Attack Requirements present) - the attacker must act within the live connection window. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit were supplied; the GitHub references are the fix (advisory GHSA-gg8q-mfhh-wrrc and remediation commits), NOT exploit code, so this should be read as a patch-driven disclosure rather than an actively-exploited threat. Signals are broadly aligned (local vector + privilege requirement + niche product all point to low widespread risk); the one tension worth noting is the 'Information Disclosure' tag versus a root cause that is fundamentally an integrity/TOCTOU weakness - treat confidentiality impact (VC:H) as secondary to the runtime integrity break (VI:H). Net: a legitimate HIGH-severity design flaw for the specific confidential-computing deployments that rely on this library, but not a broad-fleet emergency given the local vector and narrow deployment footprint.

An attacker who already has local access to a host acting as the Attester waits until a verifying peer has successfully appraised the Evidence and established the attested TLS connection. During the live connection the attacker modifies the workload's code, data, or configuration; because the library attested only once at setup, the peer keeps treating the (now stale) initial Evidence as current and continues trusting the compromised endpoint. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis.