Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2026-10224?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2026-10224. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.0%.

hermes-agent CVE-2026-10224

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-10224?

CVE-2026-10224 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 5.5 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

EUVD-2026-33557 MEDIUM

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption (CWE-400)

2026-06-01 VulDB

GHSA-pmqc-57g8-c22c

Denial Of Service Hermes Agent

5.5

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulDB

Severity by source

Vendor (VulDB) PRIMARY

5.5 MEDIUM

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Primary rating from Vendor (VulDB) · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorVendor: VulDB

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jun 01, 2026 - 06:22 vuln.today

CVSS changed

Jun 01, 2026 - 06:22 NVD

5.3 (MEDIUM) 5.5 (MEDIUM)

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

13 pypi packages depend on hermes-agent (13 direct, 1 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 0.19.0.

DescriptionCVE.org

A security vulnerability has been detected in NousResearch hermes-agent up to 2026.4.30. This vulnerability affects the function _handle_webhook_request of the file gateway/platforms/feishu.py of the component Webhook Endpoint. Such manipulation leads to resource consumption. The attack can be launched remotely. The exploit has been disclosed publicly and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

AnalysisAI

Uncontrolled resource consumption in NousResearch hermes-agent (all versions through 2026.4.30) allows remote unauthenticated attackers to degrade service availability by sending crafted requests to the Feishu webhook endpoint. The vulnerable function _handle_webhook_request in gateway/platforms/feishu.py fails to bound resource usage during webhook processing, enabling denial-of-service conditions. A publicly available proof-of-concept exploit exists (hosted on GitHub), the vendor did not respond to responsible disclosure, and no patch has been released - leaving all deployments with active Feishu integration exposed with no official remediation path.

Technical ContextAI

The affected component is the Feishu (Lark/ByteDance enterprise messaging) webhook integration layer within hermes-agent, an AI agent framework by NousResearch. The specific function _handle_webhook_request in gateway/platforms/feishu.py processes inbound webhook POST requests from the Feishu platform. CWE-400 (Uncontrolled Resource Consumption) indicates the root cause: the function does not enforce limits on the computational or memory resources consumed per request, meaning a single or repeated crafted payload can monopolize server resources. This class of vulnerability typically manifests as missing rate limiting, missing payload size validation, unbounded parsing loops, or expensive synchronous operations triggered per webhook call. The CPE string cpe:2.3:a:nousresearch:hermes-agent:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* confirms all tracked versions of the application package are affected, with no version floor specified.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis, and the vendor did not respond to the original disclosure. Organizations should take immediate compensating controls: first, restrict network access to the Feishu webhook endpoint (typically an HTTP/HTTPS endpoint) by placing it behind an API gateway, reverse proxy, or firewall that enforces rate limiting - for example, limit inbound requests per source IP to a threshold appropriate for expected Feishu traffic volume. Second, if the Feishu integration is not actively used, disable the Feishu webhook handler entirely in the hermes-agent configuration to eliminate the attack surface; note this removes Feishu platform integration functionality. Third, implement request body size limits at the reverse proxy layer (e.g., client_max_body_size in nginx) to prevent large-payload resource exhaustion. Fourth, consider deploying the webhook endpoint in an isolated container or process with CPU and memory cgroup limits to contain blast radius if exploitation occurs. Upstream references for tracking patch availability: https://vuldb.com/vuln/367503 and the POC for understanding attack shape: https://gist.github.com/YLChen-007/0304e313d811f187ade93d3b01de0f87.