GlobalProtect App CVE-2026-0295

Exploitation requires a locally authenticated low-privileged account (PR:L per CVSS 4.0) on a macOS system with GlobalProtect App installed and actively running. The AT:P metric confirms that specific timing conditions must be met - the attacker must win a race window in a privileged component, making exploitation non-deterministic and requiring repeated attempts. The vulnerability is strictly platform-scoped to macOS; Palo Alto Networks has explicitly confirmed GlobalProtect on Linux, Windows, iOS, Android, and Chrome OS is not affected. Remote unauthenticated exploitation is not possible given AV:L. Practical exploitation is further constrained by the need for local shell access and race condition reliability challenges, limiting realistic threat actors to insiders, post-compromise lateral movers, or attackers who have already achieved initial access on the endpoint.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 4.1 (Medium) accurately represents real-world exploitability given the cumulative constraints. AV:L restricts exploitation to actors with an existing foothold - remote unauthenticated exploitation is not possible. AT:P acknowledges that race condition timing must be won, making reliable exploitation non-trivial and harder to automate (consistent with AU:N in the supplemental vector). PR:L confirms an attacker must already possess a low-privileged local account. That said, the consequence of successful exploitation is severe: VC:H and VI:H reflect full root-level access on the vulnerable macOS endpoint. No KEV listing and E:U (unreported exploitation) in the supplemental vector indicate no confirmed or even POC-level public exploitation at time of analysis. The V:D (deployment-sensitive) modifier suggests organizational context affects practical severity - environments where shared macOS workstations or developer machines run GlobalProtect face higher insider-threat or post-compromise lateral-movement risk. Overall, this is a real and significant local privilege escalation, but it is not an immediate mass-exploitation risk; organizations should prioritize patching on shared macOS endpoints and systems accessible to untrusted local users.

A low-privileged macOS user with a local account on an enterprise machine running GlobalProtect repeatedly triggers concurrent operations targeting a race window in a privileged GlobalProtect component - likely a root-owned helper process or daemon - until the timing condition is won, allowing the attacker to redirect a privileged operation to execute attacker-controlled code in the root context. No public POC has been identified at time of analysis, and the timing-dependent nature of the race (AT:P) increases the practical effort required for reliable, consistent exploitation. This scenario is most relevant in post-compromise or insider-threat contexts where an attacker already holds a low-privileged shell on the target macOS endpoint.