GlobalProtect App CVE-2026-0267

Exploitation requires a local user account on the macOS system running the GlobalProtect app - matching the CVSS PR:L (Low Privileges) metric. The critical limiting condition is that the GlobalProtect deployment must be configured with a passcode (disable, disconnect, or uninstall passcode) set by the administrator; if no passcode is configured, there is no secret to expose and no bypass to achieve. The vulnerability only matters in environments where administrators have deliberately enabled passcode-based lockout as an enforcement mechanism. Exploitation is further constrained to macOS (per description); the UWP CPE listing introduces platform ambiguity not yet clarified by vendor. No network access, special software, or elevated privileges are required beyond a standard local session. The main factor limiting real-world impact is the local-access prerequisite - remote unauthenticated exploitation is not possible given the AV:L vector.

Real-world risk is moderate-to-elevated for organizations relying on GlobalProtect passcodes as an enforcement boundary. The CVSS 4.0 base score of 4.4 reflects local-only access and no active exploitation, but the qualitative impact is higher than the number suggests: the passcode mechanism is specifically designed to prevent security bypass, so its compromise directly undermines a deliberate defensive control. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/PR:L/VC:H) confirms the exploit is local and low-privileged, meaning it requires an attacker already on the machine - but insider threat scenarios and post-compromise lateral movement both fit this profile well. No EPSS score was provided in available data; exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified. CISA KEV status is absent, and the E:U supplemental metric indicates no reported exploitation. However, the R:A (Automatable: No) and V:D (Value Density: Diffuse) metrics suggest this is not a mass-exploitation risk but rather a targeted attack enabler. The advisory cross-references CVE-2024-8687, a prior Palo Alto advisory in the same product area, suggesting a pattern of similar disclosure.

A low-privileged local user on a managed macOS endpoint - such as a contractor, disgruntled employee, or attacker with initial foothold via phishing - reads a GlobalProtect log or configuration file containing the administrator-set passcode in cleartext or recoverable form. Armed with the passcode, the user enters it into the GlobalProtect interface to disconnect or uninstall the agent, removing endpoint telemetry, DLP enforcement, and VPN split-tunnel controls for their session without triggering the intended administrative lockout. No public exploit code exists at time of analysis, but the technique requires no specialized tooling.