What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-65293?

CVE-2025-65293 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 6.6 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 1.1%.

Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2025-65293?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2025-65293. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 1.1%.

Aqara Camera Hub G3 CVE-2025-65293

MEDIUM

Command Injection (CWE-77)

2025-12-10 cve@mitre.org

Command Injection Camera Hub G3 Firmware

6.6

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: mitre

Severity by source

Vendor (mitre) PRIMARY

6.6 MEDIUM

AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

6.6 MEDIUM

AV:P because the QR code must be physically scanned by the camera; UI:R and the setup/reset window gate it; command injection yields full root so C/I/A:H.

3.1 AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).

CVSS VectorVendor: mitre

Attack Vector

Physical

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Sep 26, 2026 - 00:03 vuln.today

CVE Published

Dec 10, 2025 - 22:16 cve.org

MEDIUM 6.6

DescriptionCVE.org

Command injection vulnerabilities in Aqara Camera Hub G3 4.1.9_0027 allow attackers to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges through malicious QR codes during device setup and factory reset.

AnalysisAI

Arbitrary command execution with root privileges is possible on Aqara Camera Hub G3 devices running firmware 4.1.9_0027 when the hub scans a maliciously crafted QR code during initial device setup or a factory reset. Because the attack vector is physical (CVSS AV:P) and requires a user or operator to perform the scan action (UI:R), exploitation is limited to those provisioning windows and is not possible against an already-configured hub in normal operation; the CVSS 3.1 base score is 6.6. Publicly available exploit code exists (a detailed PoC write-up is published), but the vulnerability is not confirmed as actively exploited (not in CISA KEV), and EPSS is low at 1.11% (64th percentile).

Technical ContextAI

The affected component is the firmware of the Aqara Camera Hub G3 (CPE cpe:2.3:o:aqara:camera_hub_g3_firmware:4.1.9_0027), a smart-home camera/hub that is provisioned by scanning a QR code with its onboard camera during initial pairing or after a factory reset. CWE-77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command) indicates that the QR payload is passed to a shell command without sanitization, so embedded shell metacharacters are interpreted by the underlying embedded Linux runtime rather than treated as inert data. Successful injection executes in the context of the firmware process that handles provisioning, which runs with root privileges, giving full control of the device (C:H/I:H/A:H). The CVSS vector CVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H is consistent: PR:N reflects that no authentication is required, but AV:P and UI:R confine the attack to a physically present attacker who induces the legitimate setup/reset scan, making the provisioning flow the true vulnerability surface rather than the device's normal network-facing services.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch was identified at the time of analysis, so remediation depends on compensating controls. First, treat QR provisioning as an untrusted input channel: only scan QR codes generated by the official Aqara Home app on a device you control, and never scan QR codes supplied by third parties, printed flyers, or shared images on a Camera Hub G3 that is in setup or factory-reset mode - this directly closes the AV:P/UI:R window and is the single most effective mitigation. Second, perform all pairing and factory resets in a physically controlled, non-public location (e.g., not in a retail or shared space where an attacker could swap in a malicious code), since the attack requires physical proximity to the scanner. Third, until a fixed firmware is confirmed, isolate the hub on a dedicated VLAN/IoT SSID and disable any unnecessary outbound access to limit post-exploitation reach if the device is compromised; note this reduces but does not prevent the root command execution itself. Fourth, monitor Aqara's firmware release channel for a patched version beyond 4.1.9_0027 and apply it as soon as it is published, since no CVE-specific patch version is provided in the available data. The public PoC at https://github.com/Chapoly1305/myCVEReports/blob/main/Aqara/QR-Command-Injection.md can be used to validate whether a given firmware build remains vulnerable.