What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-65292?

CVE-2025-65292 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.3 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.8%.

Which versions of Aqara Hub are affected by CVE-2025-65292?

Aqara Camera Hub G3 (4.1.9_0027), Hub M2 (4.3.6_0027), and Hub M3 (4.3.6_0025) are affected by a high-severity command injection flaw that can let a local-network-adjacent actor with low-privileged…

Is there a public PoC exploit available for CVE-2025-65292?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for CVE-2025-65292. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.8%.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2025-65292?

Within 24 hours, inventory all Aqara Camera Hub G3 on 4.1.9_0027, Hub M2 on 4.3.6_0027, and Hub M3 on 4.3.6_0025, and immediately isolate any confirmed device to a dedicated VLAN or guest network with no access to sensitive internal systems; disable remote access, UPnP, and any hostname/domain-processing features where possible, review and revoke unnecessary paired companion-app sessions, and instruct users not to interact with untrusted domains or links while using the Aqara app. Within 7 days, contact Aqara support to request a fixed firmware version and timeline, enforce DNS filtering and outbound allowlisting for these hubs, restrict local network access to known trusted users and devices, and enable logging/monitoring for unusual DNS queries, outbound connections, or device reboots/crashes. Within 30 days, if no vendor patch is available, formally risk-assess whether the affected hubs must be replaced or removed from service, apply any vendor mitigations, and maintain enhanced monitoring until a patch is released; do not rely on the modest EPSS score as a reason to defer isolation.

Aqara Hub CVE-2025-65292

HIGH

Command Injection (CWE-77)

2025-12-10 cve@mitre.org

Command Injection Hub M2 Firmware Hub M3 Firmware Camera Hub G3 Firmware

7.3

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: mitre

Severity by source

Vendor (mitre) PRIMARY

7.3 HIGH

AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

7.4 HIGH

Malicious-domain delivery points to local-network (companion-app/on-path DNS) reach rather than console-only, so AV:A over vendor's AV:L; low-priv paired access (PR:L) and a triggering action (UI:R) yield root (C/I/A:H).

3.1 AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (mitre).

CVSS VectorVendor: mitre

Attack Vector

Local

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

Required

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Sep 25, 2026 - 23:51 vuln.today

CVE Published

Dec 10, 2025 - 22:16 cve.org

HIGH 7.3

DescriptionCVE.org

Command injection vulnerability in Aqara Hub devices including Camera Hub G3 4.1.9_0027, Hub M2 4.3.6_0027, and Hub M3 4.3.6_0025 allows attackers to execute arbitrary commands with root privileges through malicious domain names.

AnalysisAI

Command injection in Aqara hub firmware - Camera Hub G3 4.1.9_0027, Hub M2 4.3.6_0027, and Hub M3 4.3.6_0025 - lets an attacker who can get the device to process an attacker-controlled domain name/hostname execute arbitrary commands with root privileges. Delivery is gated: the CVSS vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R) indicates local-network-adjacent access, low-privileged credentials (e.g. a paired companion-app session), and a user-triggered action are required; our own assessment raises the access vector to AV:A (adjacent network) because 'malicious domain names' implies DNS/network-borne delivery rather than physical console access. Publicly available exploit code exists (a detailed GitHub write-up), but the flaw is not in CISA KEV and EPSS is modest at 0.80% (55th percentile), so exploitation in the wild is not confirmed; only the exact firmware builds listed are confirmed affected.

Technical ContextAI

The root cause is CWE-77 (Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command), the classic command-injection class in which untrusted input is concatenated into a shell/OS command without sanitization or escaping. Here the injected input is a domain name or hostname supplied by an attacker - the hub firmware passes it into a command execution context in a way that permits shell metacharacter or argument injection, and because the vulnerable process runs as root, successful injection yields full device compromise (C:H/I:H/A:H with S:U). The affected components are the Aqara hub firmware images identified by CPE as aqara:camera_hub_g3_firmware:4.1.9_0027, aqara:hub_m2_firmware:4.3.6_0027, and aqara:hub_m3_firmware:4.3.6_0025. The delivery model - attacker-controlled domain names - suggests the injection surfaces through name resolution or a DNS/hostname-handling feature rather than serial console access, which is why a network-adjacent (AV:A) assessment is more realistic than the NVD-published AV:L, even though both agree on low privileges (PR:L) and required user interaction (UI:R).

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis, so remediate through containment and hardening of the local network path this flaw depends on. Because exploitation requires attacker-influenced domain-name resolution plus a low-privileged local/adjacent session and user interaction, the highest-value mitigations are: isolate Aqara hubs on a dedicated IoT VLAN or SSID that cannot reach management workstations or NAS appliances, with inter-VLAN traffic denied (trade-off: no direct LAN access to the hub from trusted hosts, so admin must use the isolated segment); block outbound and inbound DNS to untrusted resolvers and force the hubs through a controlled resolver with domain allow-listing (trade-off: may break cloud/Aqara app functionality and firmware updates if the allow-list is too narrow); and treat any paired companion-app account as privileged - rotate Aqara account credentials, review paired users, and remove unused sessions, since PR:L indicates a low-privileged authenticated path is sufficient. Monitor the vendor advisory and the public report at https://github.com/Chapoly1305/myCVEReports/blob/main/Aqara/DNS-Command-Injection.md for a fixed firmware version, and apply it as soon as Aqara releases one; until then, do not expose these hubs to untrusted networks and avoid actions that let third parties influence hostname or domain resolution on the device.