parse-ini CVE-2025-63703

Exploitation requires that a consuming Node.js application actually pass attacker-controlled INI text to parse-ini 1.0.6's parsing routine (index.js) and that the crafted input contain prototype-polluting keys such as '__proto__', 'constructor', or 'prototype'. The high (C:H/I:H/A:H) impact is further gated on the application later consuming the polluted property or a suitable pollution gadget being present; without untrusted input reaching the parser, the network vector implied by AV:N does not materialize. Limiting factors: the flaw is only reachable through applications that both depend on this obscure package and expose it to untrusted input, which is uncommon, and realistic escalation to code execution depends on application-specific gadgets rather than the parser alone.

The signals here conflict sharply and should be weighed together rather than trusting the headline score. The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8) and SSVC (Technical Impact: total, Automatable: yes) describe a maximally severe, easily automated flaw. However, EPSS is only 0.02% (5th percentile), SSVC Exploitation is 'none', and there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, which points to negligible current real-world exploitation. The CVSS network/unauthenticated/no-interaction rating is also optimistic for a library flaw: exploitability depends entirely on whether a downstream application feeds untrusted input into parse-ini and whether a usable pollution gadget exists - a real-world limiter the base score cannot capture. The true C:H/I:H/A:H impact is likewise conditional on the consuming application, not intrinsic to the parser. Net assessment: this is a low-priority issue in practice for most organizations because the package is rarely used, even though any environment that does parse untrusted INI with parse-ini 1.0.6 should treat it seriously.

A Node.js application uses parse-ini 1.0.6 to parse INI configuration or profile data supplied by a user (for example an uploaded settings file or an API field). The attacker submits INI content containing a '__proto__' section/key that sets a property such as isAdmin or a command option, polluting Object.prototype so the application later reads the attacker-controlled value; a reference gist exists but no weaponized public exploit is identified. Depending on downstream gadgets this yields authorization bypass, denial of service, or arbitrary code execution.