Anki CVE-2025-62185

Requires three concrete conditions: (1) the victim imports an untrusted/attacker-supplied shared deck, which places a payload named exactly youtube-dl.exe, yt-dlp.exe, or yt-dlp_x86.exe into Anki's media folder; (2) the deck contains a YouTube link on a card that the victim actually plays, triggering mpv's youtube-dl integration; (3) an affected Anki version before 25.02.5 that still invokes mpv without '--no-ytdl'. Limiting factors: the attack is local/file-based (AV:L), depends on user interaction (importing a deck and playing the specific card), and the .exe payload names make it Windows-specific as described; it does not affect users who never import third-party decks or who are on 25.02.5 or later.

CVSS 7.8 (HIGH) is driven entirely by the full C:H/I:H/A:H impact of arbitrary code execution, not by ease of exploitation: the vector is AV:L (local/file-based) and the real attack requires a victim to import an attacker-crafted shared deck and then play a card containing a YouTube link. The exploitation-probability signals all point low: EPSS is 0.15% (4th percentile), there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code was identified in the provided data. These signals are consistent - a high-impact but hard-to-mass-exploit, socially-engineered local flaw rather than an internet-facing, wormable priority. One conflict to note: NVD's vector lists PR:L/UI:N, but the described attack needs no attacker privileges on the target and does require the victim to import a deck and trigger playback, which is better modeled as PR:N/UI:R - verify against vendor. Net: real but lower-urgency; prioritize patching for users who routinely import third-party shared decks, below any remotely-exploitable KEV items.

An attacker publishes a malicious shared Anki deck whose media bundle includes a trojanized executable named yt-dlp.exe (or youtube-dl.exe / yt-dlp_x86.exe); when a victim imports the deck the file lands in Anki's media folder. When the victim studies a card containing a YouTube link, mpv's youtube-dl integration resolves and executes the planted binary from that folder, running attacker code with the user's privileges. No public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is local (AV:L) but low-complexity (AC:L) once the deck is imported and the YouTube card is played.