Tencent HunyuanDiT CVE-2025-13712
HIGHAttack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessCraft malicious serialized merge artifact
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DeliveryDeliver via malicious page or file
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ExploitVictim loads artifact into merge endpoint
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ExecutionUntrusted data deserialized without validation
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ImpactArbitrary code executed as root
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A08:2025 - Software or Data Integrity Failures
ASVS 5.0
V1 - Encoding and Sanitization Safe deserialization, type allowlists
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Execution, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires a user running Tencent HunyuanDiT to load or process an attacker-supplied artifact through the merge endpoint - the condition is that untrusted, attacker-controlled serialized data reaches that endpoint, where it is deserialized without proper validation (CWE-502). Limiting factors that reduce real-world risk: (1) the attack vector is local (AV:L), not network-reachable, so the attacker must get their malicious file/page in front of the victim; (2) user interaction is mandatory (UI:R) - the victim must actively visit a malicious page or open a malicious file; (3) exploitation targets an environment that already has HunyuanDiT installed and is willing to ingest external model/merge files. There is no authentication barrier (PR:N), and successful exploitation runs with root privileges, so environments that routinely load third-party model artifacts are most exposed. |
| Impact | This is a genuine but conditionally-exploitable code-execution flaw rather than a drop-everything emergency. The provided CVSS 3.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H, base 7.8 HIGH) is internally consistent with the description: exploitation is local (AV:L) and requires user interaction (UI:R) - the victim must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file - but needs no prior authentication (PR:N) and yields full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact because code runs in the context of root. The signals mostly align and point AWAY from mass exploitation: EPSS is only 0.51% (42nd percentile), the CVE is NOT in CISA KEV, and no public exploit was supplied in the input. The deserialization pattern (CWE-502) is a historically reliable RCE class, so weaponization is plausible if a researcher publishes a gadget chain, but as of this analysis no public exploit is identified. The key tension to flag: the AV:L + UI:R combination means this is NOT remotely wormable - it depends on luring a user who runs the HunyuanDiT app into processing an attacker-controlled model/merge artifact, which caps real-world blast radius. Net priority: moderate - patch promptly in any environment running HunyuanDiT that ingests untrusted model files, but this does not carry the urgency of a network-facing, no-interaction RCE. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An attacker crafts a malicious serialized model/merge artifact and distributes it (e.g., on a model-sharing site or via a malicious page/file) to a user running Tencent HunyuanDiT. When the victim loads or merges that artifact through the vulnerable merge endpoint, the untrusted data is deserialized and attacker-controlled code executes as root. No public exploit was provided in the input, but the CWE-502 deserialization pattern and local attack vector (AV:L/UI:R) make a working gadget chain realistic for a motivated researcher. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 19, 2026
Deserialization of untrusted data in the merge endpoint of Tencent HunyuanDiT lets an attacker who convinces a user to open a malicious model file or visit a crafted page execute arbitrary code with root privileges on the affected installation. The flaw is reachable only through a local attack vector and requires the victim to actively interact with the attacker-supplied artifact, but no authentication is needed and successful exploitation yields full confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and CISA KEV does not list the issue; EPSS sits at 0.51% (42nd percentile), indicating low predicted exploitation activity, so risk is concentrated in environments that routinely ingest third-party model, LoRA, or ControlNet checkpoints.
RemediationAI
Apply the upstream fix commit d2cb9cde5c9dc6a6c01735dcb92fe7699ddf6bc5 (see https://github.com/Tencent-Hunyuan/HunyuanDiT/commit/d2cb9cde5c9dc6a6c01735dcb92fe7699ddf6bc5), which raises the dependency floor to torch>=2.7.1 and torchvision>=0.21.0 so that torch.load defaults to weights_only=True; note that this is an upstream commit-based fix and a tagged patched release was not independently confirmed, so verify the pins in your own requirements.txt. Expect possible breakage from the torch/torchvision upgrade against pinned libraries such as timm==0.9.5 and older diffusers builds, and expect legacy checkpoints to fail loading unless weights_only=False is explicitly set - treat any such override as a security decision, not a convenience one. Until the upgrade is deployed, disable or network-firewall the merge endpoint so only trusted operators can reach it, refuse to load .pt/.ckpt/.bin model, LoRA, and ControlNet artifacts from untrusted or downloaded sources, and run HunyuanDiT as a dedicated unprivileged user inside a container so that the AV:L/PR:N payload cannot obtain root; the trade-offs are reduced model-sharing flexibility and, for the non-root/container step, extra setup plus potential GPU device passthrough configuration work. Monitor the ZDI advisory at https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-1028/ for any updated remediation guidance.
Affected ProductsAI
Tencent HunyuanDiT installations built from source prior to commit d2cb9cde5c9dc6a6c01735dcb92fe7699ddf6bc5 are affected, specifically anything still pinned to torch2.0.0 and torchvision0.14.1 as shipped in the project's requirements.txt and README install instructions; the vulnerable component is the merge endpoint in app/hydit_app.py. No CPE identifiers were supplied by NVD for this CVE. The vendor fix is documented in the GitHub commit https://github.com/Tencent-Hunyuan/HunyuanDiT/commit/d2cb9cde5c9dc6a6c01735dcb92fe7699ddf6bc5 and the disclosure details are in the ZDI advisory https://www.zerodayinitiative.com/advisories/ZDI-25-1028/ (ZDI-CAN-27190). Because no versioned release was named in the available data, version ranges cannot be stated more precisely than "builds preceding the fix commit".
Affects your stack
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Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-502, deserialization of untrusted data, in the merge endpoint of the HunyuanDiT application code (app/hydit_app.py), which loads user-supplied model artifacts without validating their contents. In Python ML tooling this class of bug typically surfaces through pickle-based loaders such as torch.load, where a crafted checkpoint can embed a __reduce__ payload that executes on load. The upstream fix commit d2cb9cde5c9dc6a6c01735dcb92fe7699ddf6bc5 addresses it by moving the dependency pins from torch2.0.0/torchvision0.14.1 to torch>=2.7.1 and torchvision>=0.21.0, i.e. adopting PyTorch releases where torch.load defaults to weights_only=True and unsafe deserialization must be explicitly opted into; the same commit also pre-creates the controlnet, t2i/model, and t2i/lora directories under the model root, indicating the merge workflow operates on externally supplied checkpoint files. The assessed vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R) confirms the attacker must land a file or page on the victim's machine rather than reach the endpoint over the network, and impact is scoped to the privileges of the HunyuanDiT process, which the description indicates run as root.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Local artifact-driven deserialization (AV:L) needing no auth (PR:N) but victim interaction (UI:R); reliable CWE-502 trigger (AC:L) yields full root-context impact (C/I/A:H, scope unchanged).
Primary rating from Vendor (trendmicro).
CVSS VectorVendor: trendmicro
DescriptionCVE.org
Tencent HunyuanDiT merge Deserialization of Untrusted Data Remote Code Execution Vulnerability. This vulnerability allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on affected installations of Tencent HunyuanDiT. User interaction is required to exploit this vulnerability in that the target must visit a malicious page or open a malicious file.
The specific flaw exists within the merge endpoint. The issue results from the lack of proper validation of user-supplied data, which can result in deserialization of untrusted data. An attacker can leverage this vulnerability to execute code in the context of root. Was ZDI-CAN-27190.
Executive ViewAI
Tencent HunyuanDiT carries a high-severity code-execution risk when users load malicious model artifacts, with successful exploitation granting root-level control of the affected installation. The exposure is concentrated in teams that routinely ingest third-party model, LoRA, or ControlNet checkpoints, and because no vendor-released patch has been identified, leadership should treat it as an operational and governance risk rather than a broadly exploitable internet threat. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; restrict ingestion to approved model, LoRA, and ControlNet checkpoints, disable or restrict the merge endpoint, run with least privilege rather than root, isolate deployments, scan and signature-verify artifacts, and monitor for malicious files or anomalous activity.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Insecure deserialization occurs when an application converts serialized data (a stream of bytes representing an object's state) back into a living object without proper validation.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
GitHub
Exploit-DB