Youtube Android Player Api
CVE-2023-0460
HIGH
Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionNVD
The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. After binding, a remote context is created with the flags Context.CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. This allows the client app to remotely load code from YouTube Main App by retrieving the Main App’s ClassLoader. A potential vulnerability in the binding logic used by the client SDK where the SDK ends up calling bindService() on a malicious app rather than YT Main App. This creates a vulnerability where the SDK can load the malicious app’s ClassLoader instead, allowing the malicious app to load arbitrary code into the calling app whenever the embedded SDK is invoked.
In order to trigger this vulnerability, an attacker must masquerade the Youtube app and install it on a device, have a second app that uses the Embedded player and typically distribute both to the victim outside of the Play Store.
AnalysisAI
The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.3), this vulnerability is low attack complexity. No vendor patch available.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-470. The YouTube Embedded 1.2 SDK binds to a service within the YouTube Main App. After binding, a remote context is created with the flags Context.CONTEXT_INCLUDE_CODE | Context.CONTEXT_IGNORE_SECURITY. This allows the client app to remotely load code from YouTube Main App by retrieving the Main App’s ClassLoader. A potential vulnerability in the binding logic used by the client SDK where the SDK ends up calling bindService() on a malicious app rather than YT Main App. This creates a vulnerability where the SDK can load the malicious app’s ClassLoader instead, allowing the malicious app to load arbitrary code into the calling app whenever the embedded SDK is invoked. In order to trigger this vulnerability, an attacker must masquerade the Youtube app and install it on a device, have a second app that uses the Embedded player and typically distribute both to the victim outside of the Play Store. Affected products include: Google Youtube Android Player Api.
RemediationAI
No vendor patch is available at time of analysis. Monitor vendor advisories for updates. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.
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External POC / Exploit Code
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