Github Action Merge Dependabot
CVE-2022-29220
MEDIUM
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionNVD
github-action-merge-dependabot is an action that automatically approves and merges dependabot pull requests (PRs). Prior to version 3.2.0, github-action-merge-dependabot does not check if a commit created by dependabot is verified with the proper GPG key. There is just a check if the actor is set to dependabot[bot] to determine if the PR is a legit PR. Theoretically, an owner of a seemingly valid and legit action in the pipeline can check if the PR is created by dependabot and if their own action has enough permissions to modify the PR in the pipeline. If so, they can modify the PR by adding a second seemingly valid and legit commit to the PR, as they can set arbitrarily the username and email in for commits in git. Because the bot only checks if the actor is valid, it would pass the malicious changes through and merge the PR automatically, without getting noticed by project maintainers. It would probably not be possible to determine where the malicious commit came from, as it would only say dependabot[bot] and the corresponding email-address. Version 3.2.0 contains a patch for this issue.
AnalysisAI
github-action-merge-dependabot is an action that automatically approves and merges dependabot pull requests (PRs). Rated medium severity (CVSS 6.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, low attack complexity.
Technical ContextAI
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-283. github-action-merge-dependabot is an action that automatically approves and merges dependabot pull requests (PRs). Prior to version 3.2.0, github-action-merge-dependabot does not check if a commit created by dependabot is verified with the proper GPG key. There is just a check if the actor is set to dependabot[bot] to determine if the PR is a legit PR. Theoretically, an owner of a seemingly valid and legit action in the pipeline can check if the PR is created by dependabot and if their own action has enough permissions to modify the PR in the pipeline. If so, they can modify the PR by adding a second seemingly valid and legit commit to the PR, as they can set arbitrarily the username and email in for commits in git. Because the bot only checks if the actor is valid, it would pass the malicious changes through and merge the PR automatically, without getting noticed by project maintainers. It would probably not be possible to determine where the malicious commit came from, as it would only say dependabot[bot] and the corresponding email-address. Version 3.2.0 contains a patch for this issue. Affected products include: Fastify Github Action Merge Dependabot. Version information: version 3.2.0.
RemediationAI
A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.
Same weakness CWE-283 – Unverified Ownership
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today