FalkorDB EUVD-2026-95488

Requires an authenticated client with permission to execute GRAPH.QUERY (PR:L); the attacker supplies the --bolt argument followed by a crafted Redis string object that FalkorDB casts to a bolt_client_t structure without validating its origin. Critically, this argument is parsed even when the Bolt protocol endpoint is disabled, so no special non-default configuration is needed - default FalkorDB installations before 4.20.0 are affected. Limiting factors: valid authentication and query-execution privileges are required, and high attack complexity (AC:H) means achieving reliable memory disclosure or corruption depends on heap/object layout; a denial-of-service crash is the most readily achievable impact.

This is a moderate-priority issue rather than an emergency. The vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N, VC:H/VI:H/VA:H, score 7.7) describes a network-reachable but authentication-gated and high-complexity flaw. PR:L confirms an authenticated attacker is required - specifically a client already permitted to run GRAPH.QUERY - which materially narrows the threat population to users with existing query access. AC:H reflects that reliable memory disclosure or corruption via type confusion requires favorable heap/object layout; denial of service, however, is the realistic and easily achievable outcome, consistent with the 'possibly disclose or corrupt memory' hedge in the description. There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit referenced in the input, so exploitation is not demonstrated in the wild. Signals are internally consistent: a serious memory-safety bug (CWE-843 type confusion) that is nonetheless bounded by the need for authenticated query access and non-trivial exploitation for anything beyond a crash. The one noteworthy amplifier is that the vulnerable --bolt argument is parsed even when the Bolt endpoint is disabled, so the attack surface is present on default configurations rather than only on hardened/opt-in Bolt deployments.

An authenticated FalkorDB client that is permitted to issue GRAPH.QUERY sends a query carrying the --bolt flag followed by a crafted argument; FalkorDB casts that ordinary Redis string object to a Bolt client structure and later dereferences attacker-influenced pointers, crashing the server (denial of service) or potentially reading/corrupting process memory. Because the flag is parsed regardless of whether the Bolt endpoint is enabled, default deployments are reachable. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, and high attack complexity makes reliable memory corruption harder than a straightforward crash.