Reachy Mini EUVD-2026-85186

Requires the attacker to be within Bluetooth radio range of the Reachy Mini robot (AV:A) and to have a legitimate operator complete the Bluetooth PIN authentication during the attack window - the exploit rides that session because the authenticated state is a single shared flag on the service instance instead of being bound per calling device (the WriteValue handler ignores BlueZ's options argument that carries the caller's identity). No PIN guessing or brute force is needed by the attacker. LIMITING FACTORS: physical/Bluetooth proximity is mandatory (not remotely exploitable over IP), and a genuine user must authenticate first (UI:R); the shared flag persists only until it resets, bounding exploitation to that authenticated window. Standalone impact is limited command access - root code execution requires chaining with CVE-2026-55419 (file upload) and CVE-2026-62661 (path traversal).

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L = 6.3 MEDIUM) is the only scored signal available; there is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no explicitly published standalone proof-of-concept in the provided data (only JFrog's documented research chain). AV:A confirms the attacker must be within Bluetooth radio range, which sharply limits mass or remote exploitation and makes this a proximity/targeted risk rather than an internet-wide one. UI:R is significant: the flaw is a ride-along on a LEGITIMATE user's successful PIN authentication, so the attacker cannot proceed until a real operator authenticates within the same window. In isolation this issue grants only limited command access (C:L/I:L/A:L), but its real weight comes from being step 2 of a JFrog-documented three-step chain - CVE-2026-55419 (media-sounds unrestricted file upload) plants an attacker script, this CVE provides Bluetooth command access, and CVE-2026-62661 (Bluetooth command-handler path traversal) executes that script as root. Chained, the outcome is root code execution, so defenders should not treat the standalone 6.3 as the ceiling. CWE-362 (race condition) accurately reflects the shared-flag TOCTOU nature. Priority is elevated for anyone operating these robots in shared/physical spaces, but the Bluetooth-range plus required-legitimate-authentication gates keep it below a drop-everything emergency absent the full chain.

An attacker positions a Bluetooth device within radio range of a Reachy Mini robot and waits for a legitimate operator to complete the PIN exchange with the daemon's Bluetooth service. Because the authenticated state is stored in a single shared flag (not bound per device), the attacker then writes CMD_ commands into the open session without ever guessing the PIN. JFrog documented this as the second link of a three-step chain that ultimately runs an attacker-uploaded script as root.