Reachy Mini
Monthly
Unrestricted file upload in the Reachy Mini daemon (pip/reachy-mini prior to 1.8.2) permits any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker to write arbitrary files to the robot's filesystem at /tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<filename>. The daemon's /api/media/sounds/upload endpoint applies no authentication, no extension filtering, no content validation, and no size cap, and is bound to 0.0.0.0 with permissive CORS by default, making every network interface the robot touches an attack surface. The GHSA advisory documents this as step 1 of a three-step compromise chain that, when combined with separately reported Bluetooth authentication bypass and directory traversal vulnerabilities, enables full unauthenticated root access on the robot OS; a public proof-of-concept curl command is embedded in the advisory. No CISA KEV listing identified at time of analysis.
Unrestricted file upload in the Reachy Mini daemon (pip/reachy-mini prior to 1.8.2) permits any unauthenticated network-reachable attacker to write arbitrary files to the robot's filesystem at /tmp/reachy_mini_sounds/<filename>. The daemon's /api/media/sounds/upload endpoint applies no authentication, no extension filtering, no content validation, and no size cap, and is bound to 0.0.0.0 with permissive CORS by default, making every network interface the robot touches an attack surface. The GHSA advisory documents this as step 1 of a three-step compromise chain that, when combined with separately reported Bluetooth authentication bypass and directory traversal vulnerabilities, enables full unauthenticated root access on the robot OS; a public proof-of-concept curl command is embedded in the advisory. No CISA KEV listing identified at time of analysis.