Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Network-reachable pre-auth OOB read against a CHAP portal (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N); crash-driven DoS dominates (A:H), with only indirect/partial memory exposure (C:L), no integrity impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload
iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is '>' and login->req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding bytes, where
padding = ((-payload_length) & 3);
any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL terminator.
The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL to ';', so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and the CHAP path is never entered.
Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.
AnalysisAI
An out-of-bounds read in the Linux kernel's iSCSI target (LIO) login handling lets a remote, unauthenticated initiator read past the end of a heap buffer when the target portal is configured to require CHAP authentication. Because login->req_buf is kzalloc'd with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS (8192) bytes and iscsit_get_login_rx() accepts payload_length plus padding, a login PDU with DataSegmentLength between 8189 and 8192 fills the buffer completely, leaving no NUL terminator; the buffer is then consumed by length-unaware C string routines such as kstrdup(), strstr() and strlen_semi(), and convert_null_to_semi() rewrites embedded NULs to ';', so adjacent slab memory is walked and disclosed. …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires a Linux iSCSI target (LIO) portal explicitly configured to require CHAP authentication and reachable over the network by the attacker. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is one of the genuinely higher-risk entries in the current Linux iSCSI-target batch because the trigger is truly network-reachable and pre-authentication. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Apply the vendor-released kernel patch by upgrading to one of the fixed stable releases - 5.10.270, 5.15.221, 6.1.188, 6.6.157, 6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5 or 7.3-rc2 - or to the corresponding downstream distribution errata that backport commit e48354ce078c079996f89d715dfa44814b4eba01 (or one of the stable-tree commits listed in the references, such as 5fac79f248c37774d1dd761406f83d25ca6ff8e4, 6ddddcad436d8e6e619204d3c848147ff2f5bf1e, b19dc17ed963ac36c0db4b52a1803fb11169f91f, 6b589ef9d5f6cdc70d2b4f269ca6cf26b5ebb076, eb9dadf4d552ebe10644871c5189286552aa48f5, 1624bff4c5118ad494d50ad94d44f22064667a7f, 3ddf3ea291a0ef2ea93b82e158960ac2cc42302b and f4825922d2fb371e2b969697d792077f1b62b62c; the patch simply changes the allocation in iscsi_target_check_login_request() to reserve one extra zeroed terminator byte). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, inventory all Linux hosts running the iSCSI target (LIO) with targetcli or equivalent and identify portals configured to require CHAP; restrict TCP 3260 access to trusted initiators and review authentication logs for anomalous login PDUs. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
Same technique Denial Of Service
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-80619
GHSA-m4f8-5753-34xg