Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H
Attacker must be a malicious FC target on the fabric (AV:A) sending a crafted FCP response (AC:H); bounded adjacent-memory leak into a local sense buffer gives C:L, with no integrity or reliable crash impact (I:N/A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Bound rsp_info_len to avoid OOB sense-data read
In qla2x00_status_entry(), the FWI2 status path advances sense_data and shrinks par_sense_len by rsp_info_len:
if (IS_FWI2_CAPABLE(ha)) { sense_data += rsp_info_len; par_sense_len -= rsp_info_len; }
rsp_info_len is a 32-bit value taken directly from the target's FCP response (sf.rsp_data_len), while par_sense_len is the IOCB data area size (28 bytes for 24xx, 60 bytes for 29xx). A hostile or buggy target reporting an rsp_info_len larger than par_sense_len makes the unsigned subtraction underflow to a huge value and advances sense_data out of bounds.
The underflowed par_sense_len then defeats the cap in qla2x00_handle_sense():
if (sense_len > par_sense_len) sense_len = par_sense_len; memcpy(cp->sense_buffer, sense_data, sense_len);
so the memcpy reads up to SCSI_SENSE_BUFFERSIZE bytes from the out-of-bounds sense_data pointer, leaking adjacent response-ring/heap memory into the command's sense buffer.
Clamp rsp_info_len to par_sense_len before the subtraction so par_sense_len can never underflow and sense_data stays within the IOCB data area. The fix sits before the comp_status switch, covering both qla2x00_handle_sense() call sites.
AnalysisAI
An out-of-bounds read in the Linux kernel's qla2xxx Fibre Channel host bus adapter driver (qla2x00_status_entry()) allows a hostile, compromised, or malfunctioning FC storage target to leak adjacent response-ring or heap memory into the local SCSI sense buffer of a host using a QLogic 24xx/29xx-class HBA. The bug is an unsigned integer underflow: the target-supplied 32-bit sf.rsp_data_len (rsp_info_len) is subtracted from the IOCB data-area size (par_sense_len, 28 bytes on 24xx and 60 bytes on 29xx) without a clamp, so oversized values wrap par_sense_len to a huge number and advance sense_data past its bounds before the capped memcpy in qla2x00_handle_sense(). …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires a system using the qla2xxx driver with a QLogic 24xx/29xx-class Fibre Channel HBA connected to a SAN, AND an attacker-controlled, compromised, or malfunctioning FC storage target that can return a crafted FCP response with sf.rsp_data_len (rsp_info_len) larger than the IOCB sense area (28 bytes on 24xx, 60 bytes on 29xx). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The vendor CVSS of 9.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/C:H/I:N/A:H) substantially overstates real-world risk. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade the kernel to a fixed stable release - Linux 5.10.270, 5.15.221, 6.1.188, 6.6.157, 6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5, or 7.3-rc1 - or cherry-pick the corresponding upstream stable commit (for example 125b12861c726e58448bb95d55b04851fb131d1f and the sibling commits published at https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, inventory Linux systems with QLogic 24xx/29xx-class HBAs, confirm kernel exposure, restrict Fibre Channel zoning to trusted storage targets, and apply the vendor patch immediately where change control allows to the fixed stable versions 5.10.270, 5.15.221, 6.1.188, 6.6.157, 6.12.110, 6.18.51, 7.2.5, or 7.3-rc1; within 7 days, test and deploy those exact kernel updates across production SAN hosts and monitor qla2xxx and SCSI sense errors; within 30 days, complete remediation for all affected assets, validate running kernel versions against the fixed list, and review SAN access controls to eliminate untrusted or multi-tenant target exposure.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-80446
GHSA-w8mp-89wx-m5rw