NVIDIA DGX Spark EUVD-2026-65606

Exploitation requires a privileged local user account on the NVIDIA DGX Spark system, consistent with the CVSS vector PR:H/AV:L. The attacker must have local system access sufficient to interact with the UEFI interface - this implies either physical presence at the machine or an existing high-privilege OS session. No special non-default configuration is described as a prerequisite; the vulnerability appears to exist in the UEFI implementation itself. Limiting factors include the requirement for high OS-level privileges (PR:H), local access vector (AV:L), and the niche deployment footprint of DGX Spark appliances. Remote unauthenticated exploitation is not possible given the local attack vector.

The CVSS base score of 6.0 accurately captures the constrained attack surface: exploitation requires physical or remote high-privilege local access (AV:L/PR:H), and low attack complexity (AC:L) indicates no race condition or special timing is needed once access is established. The scope change (S:C) with High integrity impact (I:H) is the most significant risk signal - UEFI-level control allows an attacker to disable Secure Boot, implant firmware-level malware, or change boot order, all of which survive OS reinstallation. No EPSS score was provided in the input data, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified. The absence of a CISA KEV listing and any public exploit code suggests this is not being actively mass-exploited. The threat model is primarily privileged insiders or attackers who have already achieved administrator-level OS compromise and seek to persist below the OS on DGX Spark AI compute nodes. The high privilege prerequisite (PR:H) substantially limits opportunistic exploitation, but for organizations running DGX Spark in multi-tenant or shared-access research environments, this represents a meaningful lateral persistence and integrity risk.

An attacker who has already obtained administrator-level OS access on a DGX Spark node - whether through credential theft, lateral movement, or insider access - exploits the UEFI protection mechanism failure to bypass the UEFI administrator password. With UEFI controls unlocked, the attacker disables Secure Boot or modifies the boot order to load a malicious bootloader, establishing a persistent foothold that survives OS reinstallation. No public proof-of-concept code has been identified at time of analysis.