EUVD-2026-62592
GHSA-cw4v-5gcf-x3cw
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Unauthenticated network exploitation with no user interaction, but AC:H reflects the required non-default static-memo-without-store operator configuration; only integrity is impacted.
Primary rating from Vendor (EEF).
CVSS VectorVendor: EEF
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated third party to obtain paid resources by replaying a transfer settled by an unrelated payer.
MPP.Methods.Tempo normally binds a settled TIP-20 TransferWithMemo to the specific challenge under verification through an attribution nonce carried in the memo. When a static "memo" is configured in method_config, check_matched_memo_binding/3 returns the match unconditionally and that binding is skipped, leaving only token, recipient, amount and the static memo value to match on. The static memo is echoed in every unauthenticated 402 response and Tempo transfers are public, so an attacker can take any matching transfer paid by a legitimate customer, request a fresh challenge for the same route, and present that transaction hash as a type="hash" credential. The hash path performs no sender or signature check tying the presenter to the wallet that broadcast the transfer.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.6.1 before 0.6.4.
AnalysisAI
Capture-replay authentication bypass in ZenHive mpp versions 0.6.1-0.6.3 allows unauthenticated network attackers to claim paid resources by reusing a legitimate customer's public TIP-20 TransferWithMemo transaction hash. When the Tempo payment method is configured with a static 'memo' value in method_config, the per-challenge attribution nonce binding that ties a specific transfer to a specific verification challenge is skipped unconditionally, and the hash credential path performs no sender or wallet-signature check - leaving only token, recipient, amount, and the static memo (itself broadcast in every unauthenticated 402 response) to match. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires a specific, non-default operator configuration: MPP.Methods.Tempo must be active and method_config must contain a static 'memo' string without a corresponding 'store' (deduplication) setting. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.2 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N) reflects unauthenticated network exploitation with high integrity impact, moderated by AT:P - the specific attack requirement that the operator has configured a static memo without a dedup store. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker passively monitors the public Tempo blockchain and identifies a TransferWithMemo transaction that matches a target operator's configured recipient address, token type, required payment amount, and static memo string (the latter obtained for free from the operator's unauthenticated HTTP 402 challenge response). The attacker then initiates a fresh payment challenge against the same route and submits the legitimate customer's transaction hash as a type='hash' credential payload. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to mpp 0.6.4 or later. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify all deployments of ZenHive mpp versions 0.6.1-0.6.3 with Tempo payment method enabled and assess exposure. …
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Same weakness CWE-294 – Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
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