EUVD-2026-45158
GHSA-6v7f-h3qg-wwpp
Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network, unauthenticated, no UI; AC:H because exploitation requires the non-default fee_payer:true deployment precondition; no confidentiality impact, but fund-spend integrity (I:H) and sponsorship exhaustion (A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (EEF).
CVSS VectorVendor: EEF
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Improper Validation of Specified Quantity in Input in ZenHive mpp allows an unauthenticated remote client to drain the fee-payer wallet in a single request by naming an arbitrarily high gas price.
When the mpp Elixir library is configured as fee payer (fee_payer: true), MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 re-signs the client-supplied base fields of the 0x76 AASigned envelope verbatim, including max_fee_per_gas and max_priority_fee_per_gas, without validating that they are within reasonable bounds. A malicious client embeds arbitrarily large values for these fields in the signed envelope. The server co-signs and broadcasts the transaction. The effective_gas_price billed against the fee-payer wallet is derived from the attacker-supplied ceilings, so the server pays those inflated per-gas rates out of its own wallet. A single crafted request can drain the wallet entirely, after which the server can no longer sponsor gas for legitimate payment requests.
This issue affects mpp: from 0.2.0 before 0.6.0.
AnalysisAI
Fee-payer wallet draining in ZenHive mpp (Elixir) 0.2.0-0.5.x lets an unauthenticated remote client empty the sponsor's wallet in a single request when the server runs with fee_payer: true. Because MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 co-signs the client-supplied gas ceilings (max_fee_per_gas / max_priority_fee_per_gas) of the 0x76 AASigned envelope without bounds checking, an attacker sets arbitrarily large per-gas rates that are billed against the server's wallet, after which it can no longer sponsor legitimate payments. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The server must be deployed as a Tempo gas fee payer (fee_payer: true) so that MPP.Tempo.Transaction.cosign_fee_payer/3 co-signs client-supplied envelopes - this is the AT:P attack requirement and the single decisive precondition; instances without fee-payer/sponsorship enabled are not affected. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is a genuine high-priority risk for anyone running mpp in fee-payer mode, though its blast radius is bounded by that configuration. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker discovers an mpp server running in fee-payer mode, crafts a 0x76 AASigned envelope embedding astronomically high max_fee_per_gas / max_priority_fee_per_gas values, signs it as the client, and submits a single payment request. The server co-signs and broadcasts it, the on-chain effective_gas_price bills the inflated rate against the server's wallet, draining it in one transaction and halting gas sponsorship for all legitimate users. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade mpp to 0.6.0 or later, which introduces MPP.Methods.Tempo.FeePayerPolicy and validates the client-signed 0x76 envelope's gas economics before co-signing (fix commit https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/commit/5d6338e2334084c5f2a78cfcca474830733ed7e8; advisory https://github.com/ZenHive/mpp/security/advisories/GHSA-vv77-66rf-pm86). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: inventory all systems running ZenHive mpp versions 0.2.0-0.5.x and verify which have fee_payer mode enabled; document current wallet balances and recent transaction patterns. …
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Economic resource exhaustion in the ZenHive mpp Elixir library (versions 0.2.0 through 0.5.x) lets an unauthenticated re
Wallet-draining denial of service in ZenHive mpp (Elixir library) versions 0.2.0 through 0.5.x affects deployments confi
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