Renovate EUVD-2026-62474

Exploitation requires the attacker to have write access to at least one git repository that is actively scanned by the vulnerable Renovate instance - this is the primary gate. The attacker must be able to commit two files: a gleam.toml with a dependency name containing shell metacharacters, and a renovate.json5 or equivalent Renovate configuration that overrides the datasource to force an update event (otherwise Renovate may not invoke the gleam deps update code path). The gleam manager must be enabled; because Renovate enables managers based on file presence, introducing a gleam.toml is sufficient to trigger the manager. Exploitation is bounded by the privilege context of the Renovate runner process - commands execute as that user. Versions prior to 39.53.0 and 40.33.0 or later are not affected. The vulnerability does NOT require network-facing Renovate APIs, admin access to the Renovate host OS, or any interaction from a human operator once the malicious commit is in place.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.4 with vector AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H reflects a well-calibrated risk profile: the local attack vector is appropriate because exploitation is mediated through repository files that Renovate processes rather than a direct network-facing interface, and high-privilege requirement (PR:H in the vendor's 4.0 assessment) reflects that the attacker must hold repository write access. Despite these constraints, this is a genuine operational priority for teams running Renovate in CI/CD pipelines: the Renovate runner commonly holds secrets such as tokens, SSH keys, and registry credentials, meaning arbitrary command execution translates to credential theft and lateral movement potential. The publicly available PoC in the GHSA advisory significantly lowers attacker effort. No EPSS data was provided in the input. The absence of a CISA KEV listing means active exploitation is not confirmed, but the tight combination of write-access gating and a working PoC makes exploitation straightforward for any insider or compromised contributor account. There is no conflicting signal between the CVSS vector and the description - both consistently indicate local file-mediated execution requiring authenticated repository access.

An attacker with write access to a repository scanned by Renovate commits a gleam.toml containing a dependency name that embeds shell operators - for example, '|| kill 1' as demonstrated in the published PoC - alongside a renovate.json5 that uses a custom datasource to make Renovate believe a newer version is available, forcing an update attempt. When Renovate's gleam manager runs, it constructs the unescaped command string gleam deps update || kill 1 and executes it via the system shell, causing the injected command to run with the privileges of the Renovate process. The PoC confirms this terminates the container's root process; in production environments with real secrets mounted, the impact is credential exfiltration or lateral movement.