Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
AV:N as agents talk over the network, but AC:H and no auth (PR:N) because the attacker must gain a swarm-peer/on-path position; S:C with I:H/A:H reflects poisoned images executing on other hosts, with no direct confidentiality loss.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Kraken agents fail to verify peer-to-peer downloaded blobs against their requested SHA-256 digest before committing to the content-addressable cache, relying only on CRC32 checksums for piece validation. Attackers on the agent-to-agent path or malicious peers can supply substituted content with forged CRC32 corrections that passes per-piece checks, poisoning the cache with attacker-chosen container image layers or manifests that are re-seeded and executed by other hosts.
AnalysisAI
Cache poisoning in Uber Kraken, an open-source peer-to-peer Docker registry, allows malicious peers or on-path attackers to inject attacker-chosen container image layers and manifests into the content-addressable cache. Because agents validate downloaded pieces only with CRC32 checksums - which are trivially forgeable - and never confirm the reassembled blob against its requested SHA-256 digest before commit, substituted content is accepted, re-seeded to the swarm, and executed by other hosts, yielding fleet-wide integrity compromise and downstream code execution. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The attacker must participate in the Kraken peer-to-peer swarm as a peer or occupy the agent-to-agent network path (the AT:P attack requirement), and the target agents must be operating in their normal P2P blob-download mode where pieces are validated by CRC32. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is a genuine high-priority integrity flaw rather than a paper high-CVSS issue. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker joins the Kraken swarm as a malicious peer (or intercepts agent-to-agent traffic) and advertises pieces for a targeted image digest. They serve substituted layer content with a recomputed CRC32 that passes per-piece validation; the victim agent reassembles it, skips SHA-256 verification, commits the forged blob to its cache, and re-seeds it. … |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch version was identified at time of analysis; the flaw is tracked upstream in GitHub issue #638, so monitor that issue and the VulnCheck advisory (https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/kraken-agents-peer-to-peer-download-cache-poisoning-via-digest-verification-bypass) for a tagged fixed release and apply it once available. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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No public exploit identified at time of analysis; no vendor-released patch available. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-61139
GHSA-xpm6-xhxf-22h5