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Linux EUVDEUVD-2026-58917

| CVE-2026-72159
2026-08-15 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67 GHSA-5wh8-rgp3-6j39

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Patch available
Aug 15, 2026 - 07:20 EUVD
CVE Published
Aug 15, 2026 - 06:21 cve.org
UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters

On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available to normal inode reads and online filecheck.

The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories. ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size, and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the claimed size.

Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules.

Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well. filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode().

Analysis

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: reject non-inline dinodes with i_size and zero i_clusters

On a volume mounted without OCFS2_FEATURE_INCOMPAT_SPARSE_ALLOC, a non-inline regular file with non-zero i_size and zero i_clusters is structurally malformed: the extent map declares no allocated clusters yet the size header claims content exists. Keep rejecting that shape, but express it through a shared predicate so the same invariant is available to normal inode reads and online filecheck.

The same zero-cluster shape is also malformed for non-inline directories. ocfs2 directory growth allocates backing storage before advancing i_size, and ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el() later walks until ctx->pos reaches i_size_read(inode). A forged directory dinode with a huge i_size and no clusters would repeatedly fail on holes while advancing through the claimed size.

Sparse regular files remain exempt: on sparse-alloc volumes, truncate can legitimately grow i_size without allocating clusters. System inodes and inline-data dinodes also retain their separate storage rules.

Mirror the check in ocfs2_filecheck_validate_inode_block() as well. filecheck reports through its own error namespace, so malformed size/cluster state is logged as a filecheck invalid-inode result rather than via ocfs2_error(), but it must not proceed into ocfs2_populate_inode().

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EUVD-2026-58917 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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