OpenStack Ironic EUVD-2026-58824

Exploitation requires that the target bare metal node was enrolled with the autodetect deploy interface, or had its deploy interface changed to autodetect, and that cleaning did not subsequently execute before the node was allocated to a new tenant. The attacker must hold at minimum Low-privilege access to the Ironic API (PR:L per CVSS vector) - this corresponds to an authenticated OpenStack tenant or project member with permission to provision bare metal nodes. The vulnerability does not affect deployments using explicitly named deploy interfaces (e.g., 'direct', 'iscsi') instead of autodetect. Single-tenant or isolated Ironic deployments have no meaningful cross-tenant exposure even if the bug is triggered, since there is no second tenant to receive the un-cleaned node. High Attack Complexity (AC:H) indicates the specific timing and configuration conditions must align - the fault occurs specifically at the interface-selection boundary, not universally during all provisioning operations.

The CVSS 3.1 score of 6.3 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N) captures a genuinely significant cross-tenant risk despite the medium-range base score. The High Attack Complexity (AC:H) reflects the timing dependency - exploitation requires the node to be enrolled with or switched to the autodetect interface before cleaning has run, which is a narrow window but one that arises predictably during normal operational workflows such as re-enrolling hardware. The Scope Change (S:C) with High Confidentiality (C:H) is the most alarming dimension: a legitimate, low-privileged tenant could access another tenant's cryptographic keys, application secrets, or database contents left on disk. No EPSS score was provided in the intelligence data, and the CVE is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, indicating no confirmed active exploitation at time of analysis. Nonetheless, even a mid-sized cloud infrastructure team - say, a regional provider in bytom - faces real, operational exposure in any environment where bare metal nodes are recycled across tenants. The absence of an integrity or availability impact (I:N/A:N) confirms the threat is purely passive data exposure, not active manipulation. The overall risk is moderate-to-high for multi-tenant Ironic deployments specifically, and low for single-tenant or isolated lab environments.

A malicious or curious tenant authenticates to the OpenStack Ironic API and requests allocation of a bare metal node that was recently enrolled using the autodetect deploy interface. Because cleaning did not execute at enrollment time, the node's disks still contain the filesystem, credentials, or application data of the previous occupant. The attacker boots the node from a controlled image, mounts the existing disk partitions, and reads residual sensitive data - all using standard tenant-level Ironic API privileges and without triggering any anomalous API calls. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.