Prospero Flow CRM EUVD-2026-56149

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated user session on the target Prospero Flow CRM instance; any role including low-privilege Support users can exploit the read and hijack vectors (CVSS PR:L confirmed). The delete vector was additionally unprotected at the controller layer due to the wrong type hint, making it exploitable by any authenticated role. Sequential numeric ticket IDs are the only enumeration prerequisite - no brute-forcing of tokens or secrets is required. Exploitation is bounded to the specific CRM instance being targeted (attackers must share the same deployment, not just the same product). Limiting factors: unauthenticated access cannot trigger these endpoints; exploitation is scoped to the tenant isolation boundary of a single shared instance and does not affect separately deployed instances.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 8.6 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N) accurately captures the threat model: network-accessible, no attack complexity, low-privilege authentication required, high confidentiality and integrity impact, no availability impact. In a multi-tenant SaaS CRM context, this is a genuine priority for any shared deployment - support tickets routinely contain sensitive customer data, SLA commitments, and operational details that competitors or adversarial tenants could exploit. The integrity impact is particularly severe: the hijack vector allows tickets to be reassigned across company boundaries, corrupting tenant isolation at the data level. No EPSS score was provided in the intelligence data, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified beyond qualitative assessment. No KEV listing and no standalone weaponized tooling are identified; exploitation requires an authenticated session and sequential ID enumeration, which is trivial to implement manually but not currently automated by known public tools. The Secur0 advisory provides sufficient narrative detail that a motivated attacker can reproduce all three attack vectors without additional research.

An authenticated Support-role user at Company A logs into a shared Prospero Flow CRM instance and iterates numeric IDs via GET /ticket/update/{id}, reading full ticket content belonging to Company B including customer communications and attachments. The attacker then POSTs to /ticket/save with a modified company_id field to reassign high-value Company B tickets into Company A's namespace, and calls GET /ticket/delete/{id} on remaining tickets to destroy Company B's support history - all without triggering any authorization check, because the delete endpoint accepted any authenticated request regardless of ticket ownership.