Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Trojanized code runs as trusted plugin with no auth or interaction and yields full site control, so PR:N/UI:N and C/I/A all High; scope kept Unchanged as impact stays within the WordPress instance.
Primary rating from Vendor (wpscan).
CVSS VectorVendor: wpscan
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
Multiple Supsystic Pro plugins were distributed with malicious code through the vendor's compromised update server, allowing unauthenticated attackers to deploy a second-stage payload that exfiltrates credentials and other sensitive data and grants full control of affected sites.
AnalysisAI
Supply-chain compromise of the Supsystic Pro WordPress plugin family delivered trojanized plugin updates from the vendor's own compromised update server, giving unauthenticated attackers a foothold on every site that pulled the poisoned release. The embedded malicious code fetches a second-stage payload that harvests credentials and other sensitive data and hands the operator full control of the affected WordPress site. Reported by WPScan; no public exploit is identified and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV at time of analysis, though the delivery mechanism means the implant is effectively pre-planted rather than requiring an active attack against each target.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the Supsystic Pro line of commercial WordPress plugins (the vendor ships several, e.g. popup, data-tables, and membership products). The root cause is not a traditional defect in the plugin's own logic but a distribution-channel compromise: the vendor's update server served plugin packages containing embedded malicious code, so WordPress's normal update flow installed attacker code as trusted plugin files. No CWE was supplied in the input, but the behavior maps to the embedded-malicious-code / supply-chain classes (conceptually CWE-506 Embedded Malicious Code, plus reliance on an untrusted upstream distribution channel). Because the code executes inside the WordPress PHP runtime, it inherits full application privileges and database access, which is why it can stage a second payload and exfiltrate credentials.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patched version is identified at time of analysis, and because this is a distribution-channel compromise rather than a code bug, simply 'updating' is not automatically safe until the vendor confirms a clean release served from a secured server - treat any Supsystic Pro update pulled during the compromise window as suspect. Immediately identify and remove or disable the affected Supsystic Pro plugins, then, because credentials were exfiltrated and full site control was possible, rotate all WordPress admin and database passwords, API keys, and secret salts, and audit for unknown admin users, unexpected scheduled tasks, and injected PHP files rather than trusting the site is clean after removal. Where the functionality is business-critical, isolate the site as a stopgap - block outbound connections to unknown hosts to cut the second-stage download and exfiltration channel, and restrict wp-admin access by IP - while awaiting a vendor-confirmed clean build; note the trade-off that outbound blocking may also break legitimate plugin update and license checks. Consult the WPScan advisory (https://wpscan.com/vulnerability/7ca5ad30-1792-4014-bfad-88911cd64713/) and the vendor's own incident notice for the confirmed clean version once published.
Same weakness CWE-912 – Hidden Functionality
View allSame technique Information Disclosure
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-54200
GHSA-8x7c-xgmw-fg3x