Juggle EUVD-2026-51278

Requires that the H2 database web console be network-reachable at the /h2-console endpoint, which is the default in the affected Juggle deployment, and that the shipped default H2 credentials remain unchanged (they are, by default). Root-level impact specifically requires the stock Docker image, which runs the process as root. Exploitation is limited only where operators have disabled the H2 console, changed the default credentials, or restricted the console to localhost/behind a firewall; under default shipped configuration no authentication barrier exists (PR:N) and no user interaction is needed.

The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H, score 9.3) indicates a fully remote, low-complexity, unauthenticated attack with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact - consistent with the described default-credential H2 console RCE. All signals align: network reachability, no privileges, no user interaction, and root-level impact under the stock Docker image. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or SSVC decision data was provided, so real-world exploitation frequency cannot be quantified from the input; however, the technique (H2 console + CREATE ALIAS) is well-known and trivially weaponizable, so the practical risk for any internet-exposed instance is high. The main limiting factor is exposure: risk is realized only where the /h2-console endpoint is network-reachable rather than firewalled to localhost.

An attacker scans for internet-exposed Juggle instances and opens the unauthenticated /h2-console endpoint in a browser. They log in using the publicly known default H2 credentials, then issue SQL that uses CREATE ALIAS to wrap Runtime.exec(), running an arbitrary shell command. Because the stock Docker image runs as root, the command executes with root privileges, giving full control of the container. No POC code is referenced, but the VulnCheck advisory documents the full technique.