Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated hard-coded token yields full device compromise; scope changed (S:C) since impact extends to subsequent/downstream systems.
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 contains a hard-coded authentication token that bypasses authorization checks for multiple management endpoints. An attacker can supply the special token value to invoke privileged functionality without valid authentication.
AnalysisAI
Authentication bypass in Autel MaxiCharger Single EV charging stations running firmware up to and including V1.03.51 lets remote, unauthenticated attackers invoke privileged management endpoints by supplying a hard-coded token baked into the firmware. Because the token is static and shared across devices, anyone who extracts it once (publicly available exploit code exists via CyberDanube) can control the charger's management functions on any unpatched unit. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | The specific prerequisite is a MaxiCharger Single running firmware at or below V1.03.51 whose management endpoints are reachable over the network by the attacker; the attacker must know the hard-coded token value, which is disclosed by the public exploit/firmware analysis. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | All available signals point to high real-world priority. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who has reverse-engineered the V1.03.51 firmware (or reused the public CyberDanube PoC) sends a request to an internet- or LAN-reachable MaxiCharger Single management endpoint including the hard-coded token value. The token bypasses authorization, granting privileged control of the charger without any valid credentials. … |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - the only source in the provided data is the CyberDanube research advisory (https://cyberdanube.com/security-research/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-autel-maxi-charger/), which does not cite a fixed firmware version. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify and inventory all Autel MaxiCharger Single units running V1.03.51 or earlier, assess which devices are remotely accessible, and implement network segmentation to isolate affected chargers on restricted VLANs with no internet exposure. …
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Same weakness CWE-798 – Use of Hard-coded Credentials
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-46432
GHSA-hmfc-f829-2xf3