GoClaw EUVD-2026-45384

Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a low-privilege authenticated session on the GoClaw instance (PR:L confirmed by CVSS 4.0 vector). The Invoke Endpoint exposed via ToolsInvokeHandler.ServeHTTP in internal/http/tools_invoke.go must be network-reachable (AV:N). No special non-default configuration is indicated as a prerequisite - any deployment of GoClaw up to 3.13.2 with the Invoke Endpoint accessible and a valid low-privilege account is susceptible. What limits exploitation: the attacker must already possess a valid account (unauthenticated exploitation is not supported by the PR:L rating); impact is constrained to low levels across confidentiality, integrity, and availability with no lateral scope change; and the product has a narrow deployment footprint, limiting the total exposed population.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P) yields a score of 5.3, placing this in the medium tier. The network-accessible attack vector and low complexity suggest broad reachability, but the PR:L requirement means an attacker must already possess a valid low-privilege account - this meaningfully limits opportunistic mass exploitation. The E:P exploit-maturity modifier confirms a public proof-of-concept exists, which elevates practical risk over the base score alone. Impact is constrained across all three pillars (VC:L/VI:L/VA:L), and there is no scope change to subsequent systems (SC/SI/SA all N). GoClaw is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, so widespread in-the-wild exploitation is not confirmed. Overall, this is a real but bounded risk: a low-privileged insider or an attacker who has already compromised a low-privilege account could abuse the Invoke Endpoint, but the constrained impact ratings and absence of KEV listing reduce urgency relative to unauthenticated or high-impact flaws. EPSS data was not provided, so probability-of-exploitation-in-the-wild scoring is unavailable.

An attacker with a low-privilege account on a GoClaw instance - obtained through credential stuffing, phishing, or lateral movement - sends a crafted HTTP request directly to the ToolsInvokeHandler.ServeHTTP endpoint, bypassing the absent authorization check to invoke internal tool functionality beyond their intended permission scope. Because a public proof-of-concept is available at https://github.com/nextlevelbuilder/goclaw/issues/1217, an attacker does not need to develop the exploit independently. Depending on what tools are exposed through the Invoke Endpoint, this could result in limited data disclosure, modification, or service disruption consistent with the VC:L/VI:L/VA:L impact ratings.