Gitea EUVD-2026-41634

Exploitation requires possession of any valid Gitea API access token on the target instance, regardless of that token's configured scope; the CVSS PR:L metric confirms a low-privilege credential is sufficient. The attacker must be able to reach the Gitea instance's HTTP(S) feed endpoints over the network (AV:N). The targeted repository must be private - public repositories carry no confidentiality expectation. No special server-side configuration is required; the bypass is present in the default Gitea deployment for all versions through 1.26.2. Exploitation is constrained by the requirement to possess a legitimately issued token for that Gitea instance; truly unauthenticated external actors cannot exploit this vulnerability. Impact is further limited to read-only access to commit metadata (C:L, I:N, A:N) - no code execution, write access, or denial of service is possible through this vector.

The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N encapsulates a low-complexity, network-reachable flaw requiring only low-privilege authentication, with limited confidentiality impact and no integrity or availability consequences. Real-world risk is moderate-to-low: exploitation demands a valid API token for the Gitea instance, meaning it is primarily a threat from insider actors, token-sharing misconfigurations, or compromised low-scope tokens rather than from external unauthenticated attackers. The information exposed is commit metadata (messages, authors, timestamps) from private repositories - sensitive in contexts where repository contents are confidential, but not a full data exfiltration path. No EPSS data was provided in the input; the base rate for this class of scoped-token bypass in niche self-hosted services is typically low. The absence of a KEV listing and any public POC further limits the urgency tier, though organizations with strict data confidentiality requirements around private repository history should treat this as a priority patch.

An attacker who holds a valid Gitea API token scoped only to, for example, issue tracking or organization access requests the RSS or Atom feed URL of a private repository they are not authorized to read. The feed endpoint skips the repository-scope check and returns an XML document containing commit messages, author identities, commit timestamps, and branch references - leaking development activity from a repository the token was never intended to access. No public POC has been identified, but the attack path requires no special tooling beyond a standard HTTP client.