Which versions of OpenClaw are affected by EUVD-2026-36620?

OpenClaw Gateway components are vulnerable to local privilege escalation attacks allowing attackers to assume operator identity and bypass authentication controls protecting downstream applications.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-36620?

Within 24 hours: Audit network access to OpenClaw Gateway ports; identify all systems with local connectivity and assess whether access is necessary. Within 7 days: Deploy firewall rules restricting Gateway port access to pre-approved systems only; implement network segmentation if Gateway is accessible from untrusted networks. Within 30 days: Monitor vendor advisories; upgrade to OpenClaw version 2026.5.18 or later immediately upon availability and deploy across all affected instances.

OpenClaw EUVD-2026-36620

Q: What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-36620?

EUVD-2026-36620 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 7.4 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

| CVE-2026-53832 HIGH

Authentication Bypass by Spoofing (CWE-290)

2026-06-12 VulnCheck

GHSA-3qg8-hq7j-jj33

Authentication Bypass Openclaw

7.4

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck

Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY

7.4 HIGH

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

8.4 HIGH

Local Gateway port access requires a local foothold (AV:L, PR:L); trusted-proxy config is a precondition but exploitation is straightforward (AC:L); assuming operator identity crosses an auth boundary (S:C) with high C/I but no availability impact.

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N

4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack Vector

Local

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Patch available

Jun 13, 2026 - 02:00 EUVD

Analysis Generated

Jun 12, 2026 - 22:34 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 contains an identity header validation vulnerability allowing local same-host callers to forge trusted-proxy identity headers. Attackers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port can supply forged identity headers to assume operator identity and potentially escalate privileges.

AnalysisAI

Identity header forgery in OpenClaw before 2026.5.18 allows local same-host callers with access to the proxy-facing Gateway port to spoof trusted-proxy identity headers and assume operator identity. The flaw stems from missing validation of headers normally set by an upstream trusted proxy, enabling privilege escalation when the Gateway port is reachable locally. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

OpenClaw exposes a Gateway port intended to sit behind a trusted reverse proxy that injects authenticated identity headers (a common pattern where the proxy authenticates the user and forwards identity via HTTP headers). The CWE-290 (Authentication Bypass by Spoofing) root cause is that OpenClaw trusts these identity headers without verifying that the request actually originated from the configured trusted proxy - any local same-host caller able to connect directly to the Gateway port can therefore inject the same headers. The CPE (cpe:2.3:a:openclaw:openclaw:*) confirms all versions of the OpenClaw application are in scope up to the fixed release.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade OpenClaw to 2026.5.18 or later as described in GHSA-rggc-m335-3wvj (https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rggc-m335-3wvj). Until the upgrade is applied, bind the Gateway port to the loopback interface or a dedicated private network reachable only by the trusted proxy (this breaks any deployment that relies on cross-host Gateway access), enforce host-level firewall rules restricting Gateway port access to the proxy's source address, and on multi-tenant hosts use namespace or user-level isolation so untrusted local users cannot reach the Gateway socket (note: this adds operational complexity for shared-tenant deployments). Strip or rewrite incoming identity headers at the trusted proxy so any forged values from downstream are overwritten before reaching OpenClaw.