Google Chrome EUVD-2026-35236

Exploitation requires the victim to visit attacker-controlled HTML in Chrome for Windows prior to 149.0.7827.103 AND to perform specific UI gestures (per the description) that interact with the Autofill feature - passive page load alone is insufficient. The CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R) confirms no authentication is needed and the attack is network-delivered, but high attack complexity indicates the attacker must win timing or shape memory precisely, and required user interaction means a phishing/social-engineering pretext is mandatory. Limiting factors: only the Windows build is explicitly named; Autofill must be reachable (not disabled by enterprise policy); and the heap corruption must be massaged into a useful primitive, which typically requires a separate sandbox escape to fully compromise the host.

Signals are mixed and should be weighed carefully. CVSS 7.5 reflects network reachability (AV:N) with high attack complexity (AC:H), no privileges required (PR:N), and required user interaction (UI:R), all leading to High confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact within an unchanged scope. Chromium's internal rating of Critical is more aggressive than the NVD CVSS High, reflecting Google's view of memory corruption risk in a default-enabled feature. There is no CISA KEV listing and no public POC at the time of analysis, and EPSS data was not provided in the input - so probabilistic exploitation likelihood cannot be quantified here. The combination of AC:H plus UI:R suggests exploitation is non-trivial and would likely require a tailored social-engineering chain, which is consistent with targeted rather than mass exploitation, but Chrome's massive install base means any working exploit would have broad reach. Treat as a high-priority patch despite the lack of confirmed in-the-wild activity.

An attacker hosts a crafted HTML page on an attacker-controlled or compromised domain and lures a Chrome user there via phishing, malvertising, or a watering-hole. When the victim performs the specific UI gesture required by the page (for example, focusing or selecting an Autofill suggestion in a manipulated form), the Autofill code path frees an object whose dangling pointer is then reused, corrupting the heap in the renderer. With reliable shaping, the attacker turns this into code execution in the renderer process, which can then be chained with a separate sandbox escape to achieve full host compromise.