Linux EUVD-2026-27682

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring/zcrx: fix user_ref race between scrub and refill paths

The io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() function uses a non-atomic check-then-decrement pattern (atomic_read followed by separate atomic_dec) to manipulate user_refs. This is serialized against other callers by rq_lock, but io_zcrx_scrub() modifies the same counter with atomic_xchg() WITHOUT holding rq_lock.

On SMP systems, the following race exists:

CPU0 (refill, holds rq_lock) CPU1 (scrub, no rq_lock) put_niov_uref: atomic_read(uref) - 1 // window opens atomic_xchg(uref, 0) - 1 return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #1] // window closes atomic_dec(uref) - wraps to -1 returns true return_niov(niov) return_niov_freelist(niov) [PUSH #2: DOUBLE-FREE]

The same niov is pushed to the freelist twice, causing free_count to exceed nr_iovs. Subsequent freelist pushes then perform an out-of-bounds write (a u32 value) past the kvmalloc'd freelist array into the adjacent slab object.

Fix this by replacing the non-atomic read-then-dec in io_zcrx_put_niov_uref() with an atomic_try_cmpxchg loop that atomically tests and decrements user_refs. This makes the operation safe against concurrent atomic_xchg from scrub without requiring scrub to acquire rq_lock.

[pavel: removed a warning and a comment]